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SEX-BIAS TOPICS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW COURSE:
A SURVEY OF CRIMINAL LAW PROFESSORSt
Nancy S. Erickson*
Mary Ann Lamanna**
Incorporating new developments in law into the legal
curriculum is a constant challenge. In recent years, changes
in legal theory and practice have often had gender as a focus.
t This Article reports on some of the findings of a project entitled "Sex Bias in the
Criminal Law Course: Bringing the Law School Curriculum into the 1980's," funded
primarily by an Ohio State University Affirmative Action Grant and other funds from
the University and from the Ohio State University College of Law.
The project proceeded in three concurrent steps: a review of seven widely used
criminal law casebooks; a questionnaire survey of all law professors currently
teaching criminal law; and a bibliography that may assist criminal law casebook
authors when they write new editions and to professors of criminal law who wish to
compensate for inadequacies in traditional teaching materials. The Rutgers Law
Review recently published the Final Report of the Project, which contained the
results of the casebook reviews, an overview of the questionnaire findings, and the
bibliography. Erickson, Final Report: "Sex Bias in the Teaching of Criminal Law,"
42 RUTGERS L. REV. 309 (1990) [hereinafter Erickson, Final Report].
Nancy S. Erickson is the Project Director. Professor Nadine Taub
(Rutgers-Newark) is the Primary Consultant. Two groups of experts lent their assis-
tance. The Panel consisted of Professors Marina Angel (Temple), Maria Marcus
(Fordham), Vanessa Merton (Pace Law School), Elizabeth Schneider (Brooklyn),
Barbara Underwood (N.Y.U), and Lauren Shapiro, N.Y.U. Law School class of 1986.
The Task Force consisted of Professors Barbara Babcock (Stanford), David Chambers
(Michigan), Victor Streib (Cleveland State), Harry Subin (N.Y.U.), and Charles Jones
(Rutgers-Newark). Professor Mary Ann Lamanna (Nebraska at Omaha) joined the
project in 1986 to further the analysis of the data and to participate in writing the
results of the survey.
The authors also wish to thank the following for their helpful comments on an
original draft of the article: Marina Angel, Maria Marcus, Martha J. Smith, and
Nadine Taub.
For a preliminary report on the Project, see Erickson, Legal Education: The
Last Academic Bastion of Sex Bias?. 10 NOVA L.J. 457 (1986) [hereinafter Erickson,
Legal Education]. For a summary of some of the study's findings and a discussion
of how to apply the methodology used in this study to other law courses, see
Erickson, Sex Bias in Law School Courses: Some Common Issues, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC.
101 (1988) [hereinafter Erickson, Sex Bias].
* Attorney and writer, Brooklyn, New York, specializing in family law; formerly
Richard J. Hughes Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, Seton Hall University
School of Law (1986-87) and Professor, Ohio State University College of Law
(1980-1986). A.B., Vassar College, 1967; J.D., Brooklyn Law School, 1973; LL.M.,
Yale Law School, 1979. All views expressed herein are hers and do not represent the
position of any organization with which she is affiliated.
** Professor of Sociology, University of Nebraska at Omaha. A.B., Washington
University (St. Louis), 1958; M.A., University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1964;
Ph.D., University of Notre Dame, 1977.
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As a "central cultural and social institution" that is "fused
with and thus inseparable from all the activities of living and
knowing,"' it is not surprising to find law affected by the
feminist movement and other social and economic forces that
have altered gender roles. In turn, law has been seen as a
powerful means of effecting social change and seeking justice
and equity for women and other disadvantaged groups.2
1. Silbey & Sarat, Critical Traditions in Law and Society Research, 21 LAW &
SOC'Y REV. 165, 171, 173 (1987); see generally F. MOORE, LAW AS PROCESS (1978).
2. Some legal and public policy scholars would qualify the claim that law is an
effective tool for social reform and the attainment of justice. They argue that legal
reforms have a substantive impact only in limited situations and that "their primary
value rests in providing legitimacy and visibility to certain attitudes and values.
These symbolic gains may be enough to satisfy some groups or may create the
momentum required to achieve instrumental goals later." J. MARSH, A. GEIST, & N.
CAPLAN, RAPE AND THE LIMITS OF LAW REFORM 5 (1982), commenting on J. HANDLER,
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM (1978).
A number of feminist legal scholars have noted that law may be an especially
limited tool for social change where it concerns gender disadvantage. For a
perspective that acknowledges "that law is embedded in our culture" but that
concludes that precisely for that reason legal reform cannot achieve social change "too
far afield of ... societal norms," see Fineman, Illusive Equality: On Weitzman's
Divorce Revolution, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 781, 781. Professor Fineman argues
that "even the most creative tinkerings will ultimately lead nowhere," and therefore
'[t]he solutions to women's inequality will not be found in the legal rules but in the
cultural and social climate in which legal rules are developed and used." Id. at 782,
785.
Others have argued that a legal ideology of equality has not managed to
overcome women's subordination because the assumption persists that legal
distinctions are based on real differences between men and women and because the
courts have hesitated to interfere with the 'right" of a man to rule his household. See
Taub & Schneider, Perspectives On Women's Subordination and the Role of Law, in
THE POLITICS OF LAW 117, 124-35 (D. Kairys ed. 1982); Estrich & Kerr, Sexual
Justice, in OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS 98, 102-20 (N. Dorsen ed. 1984); Freedman, Sex
Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92 YALE L.J. 913 (1983). The idea
of distinct private (family) and public spheres has emerged in modern society. See
P. BERGER, B. BERGER & H. KELLNER, THE HOMELESS MIND-MODERNIZATION AND
CONSCIOUSNESS (1973). Some scholars posit that this idea has rendered socially
invisible much discrimination and victimization of women, placing it beyond legal
scrutiny. On the other hand, the "right of privacy," enunciated by the Supreme Court
from Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) onward, has protected
women from state intrusion into reproductive decision making.
Finally, Wendy Williams asserts that "women's equality as delivered by the
courts can only be an integration into a pre-existing, predominately male world."
Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism,
7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175, 175 (1982).
Nevertheless, this study of the teaching of gender-related topics in criminal law
presumes that changes in law, legal education, and legal practice do have a
significant impact on the status of women in society. Many of the authors cited above
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How have these legal and social developments affected
legal education? The most visible change is that women now
comprise approximately forty-two percent of full-time law stu-
dents.3 We know far less, however, about curricular change:
Does law as it is taught take into account the interests and
experiences of women as well as men? Does it address issues
of sex bias in the law?
This research asks and partially answers these questions
with regard to the teaching of criminal law. Data from a
survey of 238 criminal law professors provide information
about the inclusion of gender-related topics in the basic
criminal law class. Gender-related topics are defined as: (1)
topics of particular concern to one sex (such as self-defense by
battered women); (2) topics that raise or have the potential for
raising sex-discrimination' issues (such as the prosecution of
prostitutes but not their customers); or (3) topics where the
legal doctrine may reflect male experience and values (such as
the "reasonable man" construct). These issues may be treated
in one of three ways in law courses: (1) they may be ignored;
(2) they may be presented in special courses on sex-based
discrimination; or (3) they may be incorporated into core
courses.
Traditional legal education largely has accepted cultural
assumptions about gender differences. Sex bias goes unrecog-
nized when law is treated as an objective, neutral enterprise
having little to do with ascribed characteristics such as
gender. Thorough criticism of this approach may be found
elsewhere, and it need not be repeated.5 Suffice it to say that
a society committed to equality in law should respect the
interests of women as well as men. Moreover, as these
critiques have made clear, inclusion of gender-related topics
commonly enhances understanding of a legal theory, as
assumptions and complexities can be more fully explored.6
themselves are involved deeply in social change through legal reform and the
formation of public policy.
3. See ABA SECTION ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, A REVIEW
OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE U.S., FALL, 1989, at 65 (1990).
4. We use the term "sex discrimination" to refer to laws that are sex based on
their face, laws that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of sex, or laws that
afford wide opportunity for discriminatory enforcement.
5. See, e.g., S. ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 27-79 (1987); Taub & Schneider, supra note 2.
6. For a bibliography of sources on gender-related topics in criminal law, see
Erickson, Final Report, supra note t, app. C.
This bibliography of books, law review articles, and other materials was
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Finally, as a matter of pedagogy, a curriculum that is sensitive
to the interests, concerns, and dignity of women will provide
a sounder educational environment for all students.
Many law schools have responded to these concerns by
developing separate courses to treat women's and minority
7issues. For example, a number of law schools now offer a
course in sex-based discrimination and the law, for which
excellent casebooks exist.'
These classes ensure some coverage of gender-related
topics, provide a forum for feminist law students and faculty,
and are important as settings facilitating mutual support
among women law students.9 This solution, however, is less
satisfying than it may at first seem, for it leaves the body of
law and the core teaching of law unchanged. If gender-related
topics are treated separately and discretely, the possibility of
illuminating traditional topics by including the perspective
provided by women's experience remains unrealized. More-
over, courses in sex discrimination are elective, and the
majority of students do not take them. Consequently, stu-
dents may have little exposure to gender-related topics and
sex-bias issues. 10
This Article addresses the empirical question of whether
law school curricula have advanced to the stage of integrating
materials on gender-related topics into core courses, thus
exposing students to gender-related topics in the law and
compiled and edited by Catherine Heid, Julia Davis, Diane Porter, and Nan Still, who
were at that time graduates of or students at the Ohio State University (OSU)
College of Law, under the supervision of Nancy S. Erickson and Joan M. Black,
research associate. Diane Porter also provided invaluable editorial and other
assistance.
7. See THEORIES OF WOMEN'S STUDIES (G. Bowles & R. Klein eds. 1983); Wallach,
A View from the Law School, in WOMEN AND THE POWER TO CHANGE, 81, 107-11 (F.
Howe ed. 1975).
8. Separate courses on sex-based discrimination (or women and the law) began to
be offered in the early 1970s, before casebooks on the subject were even published.
The first casebook was L. KANOWITz, SEX ROLES IN LAW AND SOCIETY-CASES AND
MATERIALS (1973), followed soon after by B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON &
S. ROSS, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW-CAUSES AND REMEDIES (1975); K.
DAVIDSON, R. GINSBURG & H. KAY, SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION-TEXT, CASES AND
MATERLAIS (1974). Current casebooks include H. KAY, TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS
ON SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION (3d ed. 1988) and J. LINDGREN & N.TAUB, THE LAW
OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1988).
9. See G. BOWLES & R. KLEIN, supra note 7; C. EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW 234
(1983); Wallach, supra note 7, at 110-11.
10. G. BOWLES & R. KLEIN, supra note 7; V. SAPIRO, WOMEN IN AMERICAN SOCIETY
1-12 (1986).
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presenting a perspective shaped by women's as well as men's
experiences. We examine one of the central courses of the law
school curriculum: criminal law. Although some of the
attention directed to sex discrimination in law has focused on
specific areas of criminal law such as rape and spouse
abuse, 11 a more systematic scrutiny of the substantive rules
of criminal law and the ways in which they are applied is
needed. Does the criminal law ensure the just treatment of
women as defendants, victims, and witnesses? Is sex bias in
the law exposed and dealt with in law schools, courts, and
legislatures? Are changes in the social roles of women and
men reflected in the assumptions of the legal system? We
examined these questions in the context of the criminal law
course as the first step in a more comprehensive study
involving the whole law school curriculum. 2
I. METHODOLOGY
Nancy Erickson surveyed law school professors who
regularly teach criminal law. The survey asked criminal law
professors about their coverage of gender-related topics, their
experience in teaching and practicing law, and certain aspects
11. See, e.g., S. ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 80-91; Schneider, Describing and
Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on
Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 195 (1986).
12. While the study on sex bias in the teaching of criminal law was in process,
Nancy Erickson worked with the Section on Women in Legal Education of the
Association of American Law Schools (AALS) to plan a series of programs at the
AALS annual meetings on sex bias in the teaching of law school courses. The first
program, on criminal law, was held in January 1985, in Washington, D.C.; the
second, on torts, in January 1987, in Los Angeles; the third, on contracts, in January
1989, in New Orleans; and the fourth, on property, in January 1990, in San
Francisco.
Legal literature on sex bias in law teaching has been burgeoning. A partial
listing, by topics, follows. Criminal Law: Erickson, Legal Education, supra note t;
Erickson, Sex Bias, supra note t; Coombs, Crime in the Stacks, or A Tale of a Text:
A Feminist Response to a Criminal Law Textbook, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 117 (1988).
Tort Law: Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 3 (1988); Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts
Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41 (1989); Tobias, Gender Issues and the Prosser,
Wade, and Schwartz Torts Casebook, 18 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 495 (1988).
Contracts: Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts
Casebook, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 1065 (1985). Constitutional Law: Becker, Obscuring the
Struggle: Sex Discrimination, Social Security, and Stone, Seidman, Sunstein &
Tushnet's Constitutional Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 264 (1989).
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of the teaching situation. The survey's primary objective was
to determine whether the typical first-year law school criminal
law course included certain gender-related topics. Its second-
ary objective was to encourage criminal law teachers to
address sex-bias issues by calling attention to many of these
issues in criminal law. Because of a lack of non-sex-biased
material in current casebooks, an instructor's ability to cover
gender-related topics in a broad and nonsexist way may be
limited. The survey was complemented by a review, also
directed by Nancy Erickson, of seven widely used criminal law
casebooks. The casebook reviews are treated in another
article.13
A. Research Design
A Panel of lawyers with expertise in criminal law and sex
discrimination formulated a list of gender-related criminal law
topics to be used for both the survey and the casebook re-
view." The Panel met four times in 1984 and 1985 and
consulted with other criminal law professors. 5 As a result
of these deliberations, the Panel produced the following list of
twenty-nine gender-related topics and subtopics including a
global question about correcting sex discrimination:
6
1. Killing of fetus as homicide.
2. Abortion.
3. Conspiracy between spouses.
4. Battering by spouses.
5. Self-defense by battered women.
6. Relationship between reasonableness and gender.
7. Wife's misconduct as provocation.
8. Rape:
a. Elements of the crime.
13. The casebook reviews and a comparison of the casebook reviews to question-
naire reports of topical coverage appear in Erickson, Final Report, supra note t.
14. See supra note t.
15. See supra note t.
16. These topics are also listed in Table 2, infra p. 201. The global question on
correcting sex discrimination, not being a substantive criminal law topic, is treated
outside the numbering system in some tables. The original list also contained
Marital Rape as a subtopic under Rape. This subtopic, however, was omitted




d. Death penalty for rape.
e. Who can be a victim.
9. Statutory rape:
a. Elements of the crime.
b. Mistake-of-fact defense.
10. Sexual harassment.
11. Criminalization of failure to act, e.g., child neglect.
12. Gender differentials:
a. In sentencing standards.
b. In capital punishment.
c. In treatment of victims and witnesses in the
criminal justice system:
d. In degrees of culpability of accomplices.
13. Prosecutorial discretion regarding
who to turn against whom.
14. Doctrine of marital duress.
15. Prostitution:
a. Elements of the crime.
b. Criminalization.
c. Vagueness.
d. Criminal sanctions on "johns".
16. Pornography.
17. Premenstrual syndrome defense.
18. "Ways that sex discrimination
in laws can be corrected."
The topics fell mainly into four categories: (1) topics, such
as abortion, concerning women's reproductive functions; (2)
topics, such as rape and spousal battering, having to do with
women as victims of male violence; (3) topics, such as the
parental duty of care, connected with women's socially as-
signed roles as homemakers and caretakers of children; and
(4) topics, such as spousal conspiracy and marital duress,
representing vestiges of the common-law concept of coverture.
These four categories might be helpful starting points for
teachers investigating sex bias in other subject areas.
For each topic, the survey asked professors to indicate (1)
whether they included the topic in their criminal law course;
(2) how much time they allocated to the topic; and (3) their
reasons for not covering the topic.17 The survey asked profes-
17. Nancy S. Erickson and the Panel designed the questionnaire, reprinted in
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sors to select reasons for not covering a topic from the follow-
ing list:
1. Not covered in the book
(would cover it if it were in the book).
2. Covered too poorly in the book.
3. Professor feels uncomfortable with the topic.
4. Adverse student reaction to the topic.
5. Not as important as other topics.
6. Belongs in another course (specify).
7. Other.
The survey also asked professors whether the topic tended to
polarize male and female students. In addition, the survey
asked professors to describe casebooks and other materials
used in the course.
The survey asked professors for the following background
information: their sex, their experience in teaching and law
practice, and their objectives in teaching criminal law (includ-
ing whether they presented a connection between criminal law
and social and political issues). The survey also asked
professors whether their schools required a criminal law
course. Finally, the survey asked professors about the
perceived percentage of women students attending their
schools and whether their schools offered any separate sex dis-
crimination courses. The survey did not include questions on
classroom climate because these are more appropriately
addressed to students.'"
To ensure confidentiality, respondents were asked to
return their questionnaires to the Polimetrics Laboratory of
Ohio State University, which coded the data and carried out
the computer-based statistical analysis. 19
Appendix B, with the assistance of Valerie Martinez and Nora Groves, under the
supervision of Aage Clausen of the Polimetrics Laboratory at Ohio State University.
18. See, e.g., R. HALL, THE CLASSROOM CLIMATE: A CHILLY ONE FOR WOMEN (1982)
(available through the Project on the Status of Education of Women, Association of
American Colleges). This report addresses the issue of classroom atmosphere. The
report finds that women's education often is hampered by inattention or even
hostility from male professors and students. We did ask the law faculty we surveyed
about perceived classroom polarization regarding the teaching of gender-related
topics, but a survey of women law students would be a better vehicle for investigating
whether the law school classroom environment is generally a comfortable and
supportive one for those students.
19. This work was carried out by research assistants under the supervision of
Research Associate Joan Black; the Project Director then reviewed it.
Sex-Bias Topics
B. Sample
A questionnaire and cover letter were sent in the spring
of 1985 to the 815 criminal law professors on the mailing list
of the Association of American Law Schools.20 Fifty-two
indicated that they do not teach a basic criminal law course,
but were included on the AALS list because they teach crimi-
nal procedure, criminology, corrections, or some related
subject. Of the remaining 763 professors, 238 (31%) completed
and returned the questionnaire.2' Because length of service,
coverage of topics, and orientation to the political and social
context of criminal law varied considerably within the sample,
we can conclude that responses were not confined to younger,
more "liberal" professors. However, we have no way of
determining how well those who responded represent all
criminal law professors.
Table 1 presents characteristics of the total sample and of
male and female professors separately. The criminal law
professors who responded are overwhelmingly male; the
thirty-six female professors compose only 15% of the sam-
ple.22
20. The Association of American Law Schools (AALS) sections on Criminal Justice
and Women in Legal Education endorsed the project. It was publicized at a variety
of law conferences: the AALS Workshop on Professional Development for Women in
Law Teaching, New Orleans, October, 1984; the Society of American Law Teachers,
New York, December, 1984; the Conference on Reforming the Sex Bias in the Law
School Curriculum, Washington College of Law, American University, Washington,
D.C., January, 1985; the AALS annual meeting, Washington, D.C., January, 1985;
and the Women and the Law Conference, March, 1985.
21. Some of the nonrespondents may also be individuals who do not teach criminal
law, in which case the actual response rate would be higher.
22. This percentage is less than the national figure (1985) of 19.1% of full-time law
faculty who are women, but more than the 11.5 % women (1986) reported to be
teaching criminal law. The statistic on proportion of women law faculty excludes
deans and law librarians as well as part-time faculty. If those groups are included,
24% of law faculty are women. ABA SECTION ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSION
TO THE BAR, A REVIEW OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE U.S., FALL, 1985, at 66 (1986)
(hereinafter 1985 REVIEW OF LEGAL EDUCATION).
To determine the proportion of women teaching criminal law, those faculty
listed by the AALS as teaching criminal justice and whose gender was identifiable
from first name were counted. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLS, DIRECTORY
OF LAW TEACHERS 1986-87, at 905-11 (1986). Donna Fossum found in her 1975-76
study that women were not very different from men in their choice of criminal law as
a specialty compared to more striking differences in choice of business-related special-
ties. See Fossum, Women Law Professors, 4 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 903, 912-13 (1980).
FALL 1990]
198 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 24:1
TABLE 1
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE BY SEX (N=238)'
Total Men Women
Characteristic %b N %b N %b N
Sex 84.8 (201) 15.2 (36)















Years taught law school
1-2 8.8 (21) 6.0
3-5 15.5 (37) 12.9
6-10 27.3 (65) 24.9
11-15 26.5 (63) 30.3
Over 15 21.8 (52) 25.9
Years taught criminal law
1-2 19.0 (45) 16.0
3-5 24.5 (58) 22.0
6-10 23.2 (55) 23.5
11-15 20.7 (49) 23.5
Over 15 12.7 (30) 15.0
Years practiced criminal law
0 32.4 (77) 29.5
1-2 17.2 (41) 16.5
3-5 24.8 (59) 25.0
6-10 13.9 (33) 15.5
11-15 7.6 (18) 8.5
























inhpo, tanceflo sc uuaI an. puiiucaLfl1 0 n Leac Ing mna
Rated on a scale of 1 to 7; 1 = Not Important; 7 = Important
1-3 7.0 (16) 7.7 (15) 2.9 (1)
4-5 20.4 (47) 20.6 (40) 20.0 (7)
6 26.5 (61) 28.4 (55) 17.1 (6)




Characteristic %b N %b N %b N
Law school has a sex-based discrimination course
Yes 63.8 (146) 65.1 (125) 55.6 (20)
No 31.4 (72) 29.2 (56) 44.4 (16)
Don't know 4.8 (11) 5.7 (11) 0.0 (0)
Perceived percentage of women students at law school
20-34% 18.7 (44) 18.7 (44) 19.4 (7)
35-44% 53.2 (125) 53.5 (106) 52.8 (19)
45-49% 12.8 (30) 10.6 (21) 22.2 (8)
Over 49% 15.3 (36) 17.2 (34) 5.6 (2)
a N's vary by category according to the number of responses to each question. One
person did not respond to the question about sex. N's on the other questions range
between 223-238 for the total group; 189-201 among males; 34-36 among female
respondents.
b Percentages are calculated based on substantive responses. Don't know/no answer
responses are not included in the percentage distribution except on the question
about sex-based discrimination courses where "don't know" has substantive
implications.
As Table 1 indicates, most criminal law professors who
returned our questionnaire were educated in the late 1960s or
later; have taught criminal law for varying lengths of time,
but practiced it little; and believe social and political concerns
are important in the teaching of law. They are more likely
than not to teach in a law school with a sex-discrimination
course and most likely to teach at law schools with an esti-
mated 35-44% female student body.
2 3
The 15% of the sample who are women have received their
law degrees more recently,24 have shorter teaching and
23. The mean of 39.6% reported by our sample is almost identical to the national
figure (1985) of 40% of full-time law students who were women. See 1985 REVIEW OF
LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 22, at 65.
24. Almost 90% of female respondents have received their law degrees since 1970,
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practice careers, attach slightly more importance to social and
political concerns, and are less likely than their male counter-
parts to teach at schools with sex-based discrimination
courses.
25
Virtually all (96%) of the professors surveyed report
criminal law to be a required course. Seven of the ten faculty
members from schools that do not require criminal law indi-
cate that most students take it anyway. Ninety-five percent
of the law schools requiring the course require it in the first
year, and it is usually (94%) a one-semester course.
II. COVERAGE OF GENDER-RELATED TOPICS
Table 2 reports data on coverage of gender-related topics,
indicating whether the topic is covered and the amount of time
devoted to it (although not all respondents answered the
question about time). Table 3 orders the topics by the per-
centage of professors in the sample who cover the topic.26 We
discuss the gender-related topics one by one, then consider
teaching priorities evident in patterns of coverage.
compared to 47% of the men. This gender gap in professional age is a consequence
of the recent dramatic movement of women into the major professions and
characterizes other professions as well. Cf. Lamanna, Miller & Moore, Women
Sociologists in the Midwest: A Status Update, 28 SOC. Q. 423, 427 (1987) (discussing
female professors in sociology departments); COMMITTEE ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN,
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN HISTORIANS, ASSESSING THE PAST, LOOKING TO THE
FUTURE 5 (1986) (available through the Organization of American Historians)
(discussing female historians).
25. The list of schools indicates that it tends to be the more prestigious law schools
that offer sex-discrimination courses, perhaps because they are better-endowed and
can afford specialized courses. Women are less likely to be on the faculties of these
schools. Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minorities and Women on American
Law School Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 537, 549 & n.65 (1988). Professor Emma
Coleman Jordan, past president of the Society of American Law Teachers, notes that,
"'[florty-one percent of the prestige schools have less than 12 percent of the teaching
slots filled by women.'" Weisenhaus, Women Lawyers: Progress in Slow-mo, MS.,
April, 1988, at 73, 74.
26. Because responses to the question why a topic was not included in a course
were often incomplete, they are not analyzed systematically. Most often, the reason
given was that the topic was not considered as important as other topics, perhaps a
redundancy in view of its omission. Table 10, in Appendix A, lists the reasons for
noncoverage checked by professors who do not cover each topic. Table 11, also in
Appendix A, provides a breakdown of topic coverage by the sex of the professor.
Sex-Bias Topics
TABLE 2
COVERAGE OF GENDER-RELATED CRIMINAL LAW TOPICS
% Who Cover Average Time
Topic Topic' Minutesb N c
Killing of fetus as homicide 83.5 95 (165)
Abortion 52.4 92 (98)
Conspiracy between spouses 37.8 35 (65)
Battering by spouses 69.5 86 (120)
Self-defense by battered women 81.0 85 (145)
Reasonableness and gender 67.0 108 (110)
Wife's misconduct as provocation 66.5 65 (109)
Rape: Elements 86.3 101 (138)
Rape: Mistake-of-fact defense 94.9 90 (157)
Rape: Diminished-capacity defense 53.1 71 (78)
Rape: Death penalty 48.9 47 (73)
Rape: Potential victims 68.4 49 (99)
Statutory rape: Elements 84.3 59 (126)
Statutory rape: Mistake-of-fact defense 89.8 69 (143)
Sexual harassment 10.8 45 (18)
Failure to act 92.7 108 (155)
Gender: Sentencing standards 13.5 35 (29)
Gender: Capital punishment 17.3 32 (29)
Gender: Treatment of victims/witnesses 24.3 60 (38)
Gender: Culpability of accomplices 19.9 83 (31)
Prosecutorial discretion: "Turning" 16.1 79 (23)
Marital duress 34.5 39 (55)
Prostitution: Elements 25.2 53 (40)
Prostitution: Criminalization 46.4 47 (76)
Prostitution: Vagueness 33.5 51 (51)
Prostitution: Sanctions on "johns" 32.9 32 (52)
Pornography 21.8 61 (38)
PMS defense 30.1 40 (52)
Ways to correct sex discrimination in laws 21.9 89 (29)
' Not all questions were answered by all respondents. Because at least 224
responded to questions about whether a topic was covered, Ns are not reported.
b Average time spent covering the topic is calculated on the responses of faculty who
do cover the topic. Evaluation of the relative importance of the topic in terms of time
spent on the topic should take into account the fact that some professors spend no
time on the topic and others have not reported their time.
'Low response rates to questions about time made it essential to report these Ns.
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TABLE 3




1 94.9 Rape: Mistake-of-fact defense
2 92.7 Failure to act
3 89.8 Statutory rape: Mistake-of-fact defense
4 86.3 Rape: Elements
5 84.3 Statutory rape: Elements
6 83.5 Killing of fetus as homicide
7 81.0 Self-defense by battered women
8 69.5 Battering by spouses
9 68.4 Rape: Potential victims
10 67.0 Reasonableness and gender
11 66.5 Wife's misconduct as provocation
12 53.1 Rape: Diminished-capacity defense
13 52.4 Abortion
14 48.9 Rape: Death penalty
15 46.4 Prostitution: Criminalization
16 37.8 Conspiracy between spouses
17 34.5 Marital duress
18 33.5 Prostitution: Vagueness
19 32.9 Prostitution: Sanctions on "johns"
20 30.1 PMS defense
21 25.2 Prostitution: Elements
22 24.3 Gender: Treatment of victims/witnesses
X 21.9 Ways to correct sex discrimination in laws
23 21.8 Pornography
24 19.9 Gender: Culpability of accomplices
25 17.3 Gender: Capital punishment
26 16.1 Prosecutorial discretion: 'Turning"
27 13.5 Gender: Sentencing standards
28 10.8 Sexual harassment
A. Killing of Fetus as Homicide
The legal status of feticide is one of the most frequently
covered topics, treated by 83.5% of respondents for an average
of one and one-half hours. This attention may derive from the
significance of homicide in a criminal law class: in responses
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to open-ended questions about class content, homicide was the
most frequently cited substantive crime."
Another reason for interest in this topic may be the spurt
of legislation and litigation addressing the legal status of the
fetus. 28 This activity arises from two sources: concern about
fetal death from egregious negligence or assault, and the
antiabortion effort to incorporate a doctrine of fetal
personhood into the law.
In regard to the first concern, courts have ruled that
however grave the circumstances of fetal death, under the
common law an infant must be born alive to be considered a
person, and hence a homicide victim.29 The Supreme Court's
decision in Roe v. Wade3" nullified most state laws that might
have defined abortions performed at the request of the preg-
nant woman as homicide, but the Court has never ruled that
destruction of the fetus by a third party without the consent
of the pregnant woman may not be criminalized. Thus, some
states have moved to define feticide by someone other than the
pregnant woman or her doctor as homicide or a lesser
crime."
27. We asked responding professors: "What substantive crimes does the [criminal
law] course cover?" Homicidal or murder was listed by 183; the next highest were
rape/sexual assault, listed by 98, and theft, listed by 57.
28. Personal communication, Diana Traub, ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project,
March 8, 1988; see, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
For reviews of law in this area, see Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions:
What's Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 9 (1987); N. Hunter,
Feticide-Cases and Legislation (May 5, 1986) (American Civil Liberties Union
Reproductive Freedom Project Memorandum, on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform)); N. Hunter, State Legislation Concerning 'Feticide' and
Wrongful Birth/Wrongful Life (Apr. 15, 1983) (American Civil Liberties Union
Reproductive Freedom Project Memorandum, on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
29. E.g., Keeler v. Superior Ct., 2 Cal. 3d 619, 625, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481, 483-84, 470
P.2d 617, 620 (1970). Keeler was displaced by an act of the California state
legislature that amended the state penal code to include the unlawful killing of a
fetus within the definition of murder. See 1970 Cal. Stat. ch. 1311, amending CAL.
PENAL CODE § 187. Section 187 was later found to be constitutional only as applied
to viable fetuses. See People v. Smith, 59 Cal. App. 3d 751, 757, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498,
502 (1976).
30. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
31. See, e.g., 1986 Minn. Laws 388 (effective Aug. 1, 1986), codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 609.2661-.2665 (1990). This created the crimes of murder and manslaughter of an
unborn child, following the unsuccessful attempt to prosecute under the homicide
laws in State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625 (Minn. 1985).
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B. Abortion
Abortion is covered by about half (52.4%) of the respon-
dents, for an average time of one and one-half hours. One
might ask why abortion would continue to be covered if few
people are now charged with the crime.32 However, although
the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade and some subsequent
decisions33 greatly restricted the power of the states to
criminalize abortion, it is still a crime if performed contrary to
state laws regulating, for example, place, licensing, length of
pregnancy, or consent.34
32. No criminal prosecution under an abortion statute appears to have occurred
from Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983), through 1988. Personal communi-
cation, Diana Traub, ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project, March 8, 1988. In 1989,
however, a Pennsylvania physician was convicted of infanticide under the state's
abortion law and is appealing. Obstetrician Found Guilty ofInfanticide, L.A. Times,
June 12, 1989, at A2, col. 3.
33. E.g. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747 (1986) (striking down a Pennsylvania informed consent statute); City of Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (striking down an
ordinance making it a misdemeanor to perform an abortion without obtaining
informed consent); see also Ohio Curb on Abortions Is Struck Down, N.Y. Times, Aug.
13, 1988, at A6, col 1.
34. For example, in Thornburgh, the section of Pennsylvania law criminalizing
postviability abortions was not considered by the Supreme Court and thus stands.
476 U.S. at 758 n.9. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989), subsequent to this survey, is likely to alter the
situation in unpredictable ways. For example, the state of Louisiana attempted to
revive and enforce its 1855 criminal abortion law following the Webster decision.
Marcus, Louisiana Moves Against Abortion, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1989, at A7, col. 4.
A panel of federal judges enjoined the state's attempt on the grounds that the
legislature had effectively repealed it in 1978 by passing guidelines for legal
abortions. 1855 Louisiana Law on Abortion is Barred, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1990, at
A17, col. 1.
The Supreme Court recently decided two cases involving notification of parents
of minors seeking abortions: Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990) (holding
that a 48-hour waiting period between notice and performance of abortion is
constitutional); Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990)
(holding that the Ohio parental notification requirement coupled with a judicial
bypass procedure was constitutional). In addition, in Ragsdale v. Turnock, 734 F.
Supp. 1457 (N.D. 111. 1990), the court granted a joint motion for a consent decree that
enjoins the enforcement of certain Illinois statutes that were alleged to require that
abortions be performed only in hospitals or their functional equivalent. The consent
decree permits clinical abortions to be freely obtained. Id. at 1461.
For further discussion of abortion-related issues, see B. MILBAUER, THE LAW
GWVETH (1983) and REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990S (S. Cohen & N. Taub eds.
1989); see also Special Double Issue: Webster v. Reproductive Health Services-
Selected Amicus Briefs, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 153-536 (1989) (devoted to Webster
briefs favoring abortion rights).
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Because Roe v. Wade is framed in terms of a constitutional
right to privacy,35 the majority of the 103 professors who
explain why they do not include abortion in their criminal law
class suggest that it belongs in constitutional law. A quarter
of those not covering abortion simply say that it is not as
important as other topics.
The topic of criminal abortion laws presents an oppor-
tunity for analytical reflection from several perspectives.
From a feminist perspective, it demonstrates the social control
of women through law. From an antiabortion perspective, it
exemplifies the erosion of legal protection for the socially
dependent. Generally, it provides an example of the changing
relationship between law and morality. Although change is
uneven,36 the last two decades reveal an important shift from
the regulation of sexual and reproductive behavior to the
conceptualization of such behavior as involving constitutional-
ly protected private choices.37
C. Conspiracy Between Spouses
At common law, one spouse could not be convicted for
conspiring with the other, on the theory that husband and
wife are legally one person (the doctrine of unity).3" In 1960,
the Supreme Court held that the common law spousal conspir-
acy rule would no longer be applied in the federal courts,39
and most states have followed suit, abrogating the unity
doctrine in this context as well as others.4"
Regardless of the apparent significance of a decision that
acknowledges the legal autonomy of married women, less than
half (37.8%) of our sample of professors include conspiracy
35. 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
36. Compare Roe, 410 U.S. at 147-64 with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189
(1986) (holding that criminal law proscribing homosexual conduct is not unconstitu-
tional) and with Michael M. v. Superior Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 472-76 (1981) (holding that
statutory rape laws that penalize only males are not unconstitutional).
37. See L. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 10-26 (1990); S. WALKER,
IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES 300-04 (1990).
38. See L. GOLDSTEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN 232 (1988).
39. United States v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51, 54-55 (1960).
40. See, e.g., People v. Lockett, 25 Cal. App. 3d 433, 102 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1972); State
v. Pittman, 124 N.J. Super. 334,306 A.2d 500 (1973); Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454
Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973).
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between spouses in their criminal law course. Of those who
did not include the topic, 73% characterize it as not as
important as other topics. We conclude that the passing of the
unity-of-persons doctrine is probably so taken for granted that
coverage seems unnecessary. It could, nevertheless, prove
useful to a discussion of the topic of conspiracy more generally.
D. Spouse Abuse
Legal issues related to conjugal violence are covered by a
large majority of the responding professors. Almost 70% cover
battering by spouses, spending almost one and one-half hours
on the topic. Self-defense by battered women is covered by
81% of the sample, who allocate a similar amount of time to it.
Inclusion of spouse abuse in criminal law courses by so
many professors indicates to us the influence of a feminist
perspective 41 on conjugal violence. For years, prosecutors as
well as the public treated spousal battery as normal behavior
rather than assault.42 Widespread coverage of spouse abuse
in criminal law courses makes a statement to students and
future prosecutors that conjugal violence is criminal behavior
and that societal response should not be limited to therapeutic
intervention. Nevertheless, of those who do not cover batter-
ing by spouses or self-defense by battered women, 46% and
34% respectively suggest that it is not as important as other
topics.
E. Relationship of Reasonableness to Gender
Given the significance of the "reasonable man" concept in
law, the relationship of reasonableness to gender is an
important topic. Although the standard of reasonableness is
usually grounded in the experience of the typical male, a
challenge to this unstated assumption has emerged in the
41. R. TONG, WOMEN, SEX AND THE LAW 124-52 (1984); FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON
WIFE ABUSE (K. Yllo & M. Bograd eds. 1988).
42. See, e.g., Marcus, Conjugal Violence: The Law of Force and the Force of Law,
69 CALIF. L. REV. 1657, 1658-60 (1981).
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context of the defense of battered women charged with the
homicide of their batterers.48
Some of the questions that arise once a professor substi-
tutes the reasonable woman for the reasonable man are:
What force is reasonable for a typical woman to use against a
typical battering male? Do her fists equal his fists? What
constitutes imminent danger of harm? If he announces, after
one beating, that he will "finish the job" later, is harm immi-
nent? How realistic a protection is flight for a woman who has
been repeatedly pursued and beaten?44
Two thirds of our sample consider the relationship of
reasonableness to gender in their criminal law course, and
those who do spend an average of 108 minutes on the topic, as
much time as any topic receives. A majority of the fifty-nine
responding professors who did not cover the issue indicated
that it was not as important as other topics. Eight professors,
all male, responded that they did not understand the question.
F. "Wife's Misconduct" as Provocation
"Wife's misconduct" as provocation refers to the reduction
of culpability for a murder perpetrated by a man who views
his wife having sex with another. This topic was covered by
two thirds of the sample for about an hour on the average.
Some respondents commented on the "sexist" phrasing of
the question; we do not know how this may have affected
their responses. Although the wording was an error (it should
have read "spouse's misconduct"), there is a sex bias issue
regarding whether the standard of conduct relevant to
excusing violence is different for females than for males for
both victims and perpetrators. For example, future research
should address whether the law still treats infidelity by
husbands as less shocking to wives than infidelity by wives is
to husbands, or considers male, but not female, violence in
response to "provocation" normal behavior.4"
43. See Schneider, supra note 11, at 212.
44. See id. at 212-14 & n.113.
45. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAw 575-76 & n.28 (1972) (discussing the
equal treatment of wives and husbands in the context of provocation by adultery and
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G. Rape
1. Elements of the crime-Rape is one of the most
frequently included topics in the criminal law course. Ele-
ments of the crime are covered by 86.3% of the respondents,
for an average time of just over one and one-half hours.
2. Mistake-of-fact defense-The central role of mens rea
(loosely, criminal intent) in criminal responsibility is reflected
in the almost universal coverage of the "mistake of fact" de-
fense,46 i.e. a claim by the defendant that he believed (per-
haps erroneously, but in good faith) that the complainant
consented. "Mistake of fact" has had a strategic role in a
traditional defense to rape. If a woman said "no," a man could
still claim he thought she meant "yes." Additionally, in many
jurisdictions her nonconsent had to be demonstrated by
resistance, even to the point of injury.47 This contrasts with
a contemporary perspective on consent to sexual contact 48 in
suggesting that traditional treatment was not always equal).
46. Conviction for most crimes requires that the prosecution prove that the
defendant had the type of criminal intent required by the particular statute.
Unfortunately, most of the cases typically used to teach the "mistake of fact" defense
to a charge of rape are highly problematic from a feminist point of view. See
Erickson, Final Report, supra note t, at 354-65 (discussing Director of Pub. Prosecu-
tions v. Morgan, 1976 App. Cas. 182; People v. Mayberry, 15 Cal. 3d 143, 542 P.2d
1337, 125 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1975); and United States v. Short, 4 C.M.A. 437, 16 C.M.R.
11 (1954)). The mistake-of-fact cases bring out such issues as the subjective versus
objective standard of reasonableness of assuming consent (if the accused believes
there is consent, even though a reasonable person would not, is he guilty?) and the
different burden of proof regarding mens rea required for a conviction for rape
compared to that required to prove assault with intent to rape. See also R. TONG,
supra note 41, at 96-98.
47. See King v. State, 210 Tenn. 150, 158, 357 S.W.2d 42, 45 (1962) ("[The female]
must have resisted the attack in every way possible and continued such resistance
until she was overcome by force, was insensible through fright or ceased resistance
from exhaustion, fear of death or great bodily harm."); People v. Serrielle, 354 Ill.
182, 186, 188 N.E. 375, 377 (1933); see also S. ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 29-32.
48. Contemporary feminist views of rape and strategies for rape law reform vary.
Some important issues are whether the crime should be conceptualized as rape,
assault, or sexual assault, and whether the victim should be required to demonstrate
lack of consent by physical resistance or whether her failure to give affirmative
consent is sufficient, particularly if she was faced with threats or force. For a
discussion of these issues in rape law reform and for data on current laws in the
various states, see R. TONG, supra note 41, at 90-123; Searles & Berger, The Current
Status of Rape Reform Legislation: An Examination of State Statutes, 10 WOMEN'S
RTS. L. REP. 25 (1987) (discussing and breaking down of data on states' laws); J.
MARSH, A. GEIST, & N. CAPLAN, RAPE AND THE LIMITS OF LAW REFORM, supra note
208
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which "the reasonable man in the 1980s should be one who
understands that a woman's word is deserving of respect .... "49
Unfortunately, reports that professors include rape and
the mistake-of-fact defense in criminal law classes do not tell
us how the topics are covered. Lack of information about the
content of coverage limits our interpretation of this data, but
securing and analyzing course content in detail would have
presented an insurmountable research challenge because of
limits of time, money, and method. With regard to rape, future
surveys might ask: (1) whether rape is conceptualized as a
single continuum of rape/assault, (2) whether nonconsensual
sexual touching should be classified as sexual assault; and (3)
what perspective on marital rape is presented.5"
3. Diminished-capacity defense-The diminished-capacity
defense to a charge of rape refers to the reduced culpability of
a perpetrator who lacks judgmental capacity because of a
temporary or permanent disability, and hence is less capable
of forming a mens rea or more likely to make an unreasonable
mistake of fact. The diminished-capacity defense received
much less attention from our respondents than the elements
of rape or the mistake-of-fact defense; it was covered by a bare
majority of responding professors.
4. Death penalty for rape-Less than half (48.9%) of the
responding professors covered the death penalty for rape. One
quarter of those indicating why they did not cover this topic
believe that it belongs in another course (with no consensus on
which course).5' Most others claimed it was not important
enough to be covered. As a result of Coker v. Georgia,52
states virtually are precluded from constitutionally imposing
the death penalty for rape.53 The fact that the Supreme
49. S. ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 97.
50. Unfortunately, marital rape, which we intended to include as a gender-related
topic, was left off the questionnaire inadvertently, so we do not have data on whether
this topic is covered in the criminal law courses taught by our respondents. Marital
rape was covered, however, in the casebook reviews. See Erickson, Final Report,
supra note t, at 364-71.
51. See infra page 246, Table 10. Only 15 out of 100 professors who do not cover
the death penalty for rape answered this question. Choices were scattered over
criminal procedure, constitutional law, women and law, sentencing, and death
penalty, with no more than three professors naming any one course.
52. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
53. Id. at 592 ("[A] sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and excessive
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Court has addressed this issue would seem to indicate a high
level of importance, but perhaps when responding professors
indicated it was not "important" enough to be covered, they
meant it was not "controversial" enough.
5. Who can be a victim of rape-More than two thirds of
professors cover the issue of who can be a victim of rape.
Questioning the traditional assumption that women are the
sole victims of rape takes a sex-neutral perspective on the law,
recognizing that men as well as women can be victims of rape;
that victimization of young males is not uncommon; that adult
males are also raped; and that women rape men and can be
accomplices in male rapes of both males and females.54
Many of the states have modified their laws to make them
sex-neutral in classifying of offender and victim." Although
this move from a sex-based to a sex-neutral conceptualization
of the crime is a major change, 30% of the sample does not
include the topic in their courses.
punishment for the crime of rape and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amend-
ment as cruel and unusual.") (plurality opinion). Justice Powell, concurring in part
and dissenting in part, indicated that the death penalty might be appropriate for "an
outrageous rape resulting in serious, lasting harm to the victim." Id. at 604.
54. There has been a widespread but erroneous belief that it would be impossible
for a female to rape a male because a male could not achieve or maintain an erection
when threatened or attacked by a female. See Sarrel & Masters, Sexual Molestation
of Men by Women, 11 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 117 (1982) (discussing actual sexual
assaults of men by women). Sarrel and Masters mention that two of the men
interviewed for their study were brought to their attention by attorneys. The
attorneys initially did not believe the clients because they thought it was impossible
for a man to respond sexually while under sexual attack by a woman. Id. at 130.
The New York Court of Appeals has stated: "Although the 'physiologically impossible'
argument has been accepted by several courts ... it is simply wrong." People v.
Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 169, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207, 217, 474 N.E.2d 567, 577 (1984)
(citations omitted).
55. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-317 to -320 (1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11 to
-13 (1984); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01-.06; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37 (1981); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-5-401 to -404 (1990). The trend to use sex-neutral language in rape
law has been growing; Field and Bienen report that by the late 1970s, almost two
thirds of the states had revised their statutes. See H. FIELD & L. BIENEN, JURORS
AND RAPE 207-458 (1980). According to Searles and Berger, that reform continued;
they claim that by 1985 "almost three-quarters of the states have adopted sex neutral
terminology." Searles & Berger, supra note 48, at 28; see also Berger, Searles &
Neuman, The Dimensions of Rape Reform Legislation, 22 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 329
(1988) (providing an interesting analysis of patterns in state rape-law reform).
Not all feminists see the adoption of sex-neutral terminology for victim and
offender as a desirable reform. See S. ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 81-83; R. TONG,
supra note 41, at 90-92.
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H. Statutory Rape
Elements of the crime (84.3%) and the principal ("mistake
of fact") defense (89.8) for statutory rape are among the most
frequently included topics in the criminal law course. Our
responding professors spend an average of an hour on ele-
ments of the crime and slightly longer on the "mistake of fact"
defense. Those few who do not cover statutory rape most
commonly explain that it is not important.
"Mistake of fact" in the statutory rape context refers to a
situation where the defendant claims he mistakenly believed
the victim to be above the age of consent. 6 Some feminist
reformers, concerned for the protection of young females, favor
eliminating this "mistake of age" defense, which has been
described as one "used to assuage the guilt of male defendants
while subjecting young females (particularly those who appear
physically mature) to accusations of victim precipitation.""
Other feminists are opposed to or ambivalent about strength-
ening statutory rape statutes because such protection also
precludes a young woman from entering a consensual sexual
relationship, to which she may be competent to consent.
These feminists view statutory rape laws as more controlling
than protective-and of course part of the law's historic role
was protecting the female's chastity as valuable property.58
Regarding exploitation versus choice in the sexual relations of
minor women, much may depend on the comparative age and
social power of the two parties. Recognizing that an age
differential may cause a power imbalance, some statutes
56. Many states allow a defense of reasonable "mistake of age," either by statute
or by case law. See, e.g., State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836, 840 (Alaska 1978); People v.
Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 536, 393 P.2d 673, 677, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361, 365 (1964)
(holding that a defense of mistake of age must be permitted, even though not in the
statute); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.030 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990) ("defendant may
prove in exculpation that at the time ... he did not know of the facts or conditions
responsible for such incapacity to consent"); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.030(2) (1989).
In some states, however, where the statutes do not provide a mistake of age defense,
and courts have refused to allow such a defense. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 105 N.J.
Super. 567, 571-72, 253 A.2d 579, 581 (1969); Vasquez v. State, 622 S.W.2d 864, 866
(Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
57. Id. at 26 (footnote omitted).
58. R. TONG, supra note 41, at 113-14.
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require an age gap between the defendant and the complain-
ant.59 Statutory rape statutes do not, however, address social
power imbalances directly.6"
As our survey indicates, statutory rape usually is included
in a criminal law course, where it is both a traditional topic
and one that permits classes to explore the changing sexual
roles of women and men, and to consider whether "pater-
nalistic" laws have a valid role to play in our society.
I. Sexual Harassment
This topic was least likely (10.8%) to be taught by re-
sponding professors. We need to note, however, that respond-
ing professors varied in how they interpreted the term "sexual
harassment." We intended the questionnaire item to refer to
lesser sexual assaults, e.g., unwanted touching, but many
responding professors assumed that "sexual harassment"
referred to sexually offensive or coercive verbal or physical
behavior directed toward a woman at her workplace.6'
59. For examples of "age-gap" statutes, see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.30 & 130.25
(McKinney 1987) (providing that any person 18 years or older (2d degree rape) or 21
years or older (3d degree rape) may be guilty of rape if he or she engages in sexual
intercourse with another person who is under the age of 14 (2d degree rape) or 17 (3d
degree rape); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.342(a) & (b) (West 1988) (defining criminal
sexual conduct with regard to a 36- or 48-month gap between the age of the victim
and that of the perpetrator). For discussions of"age-gap" statutes, see Bienen, Rape
Ill-National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 170,
193-96 (1980) and Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63
TEXAS L. REV. 387, 404, 411-12 (1984).
60. Other laws-for example those concerning incest, competence to consent, and
sexual harassment-attempt to address social power issues in the sexual consent
context. See Erickson, Final Report, supra note t, at 387-88.
61. A number of states include a statutory offense of"non-consensual touching" of
intimate body parts. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw § 130.55 (McKinney 1987) (a person
is guilty of sexual abuse in the third degree when he subjects another person to
sexual contact without the latter's consent); id. § 130.00(3) (defining sexual contact
as "any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person not married to the
actor for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire of either party"); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2907.05 (Baldwin 1988) (defining the crime of "gross sexual imposition");
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-404 (1990) (defining the crime of"forcible sexual abuse"); see
also Searles & Berger, supra note 48, at 28, 32 (table 3). Sexual harassment in the
workplace is defined more broadly to include, for example, verbal harassment,
coercion of sexual acts through threats ofjob retaliation or offers of advancement, and
212
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Most of those who did not cover sexual harassment
(44.6%) thought that it belonged in another course, commonly
sex discrimination or employment discrimination. Responding
professors may have mistakenly thought that workplace
sexual harassment is not a crime. In fact, much
employment-related sexual harassment is criminal behavior,
for which a victim may seek both criminal and civil sanc-
tions.62 As with other topics, substantial proportions thought
that it was not important (32.2%) or that coverage by the
casebook was inadequate (23.2%).
J. Failure to Act
Although criminal laws are commonly negative in form
and interdict certain behaviors, failure to perform certain
societally prescribed duties may also be criminalized. 6 The
questionnaire listed "child neglect" as a specific application of
"failure to act."
Although the relevant statutes are generally sex-neutral,
"failure to act" is a gender-related topic because the mother's,
rather than the father's, responsibility to protect and nurture
the child is usually at issue in everyday applications of the
law. The mother may be single, but even if married, she is
socially designated as the primary parent. In addition, it may
be the woman's partner, often the child's father or stepfather,
the existence of a work environment that is intimidating and stressful because of
sexual jokes and innuendos. Sexual harassment is prohibited by Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988). See Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-67 (1986) (holding that hostile environment sexual
harassment is actionable as sex-discrimination under Title VII, and citing Title VII
and applicable EEOC guidelines); see also EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11
(1991).
62. See generally R. TONG, supra note 41, at 71-86 (discussing criminal law, tort,
and extralegal means of addressing the problem of sexual harassment).
63. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Konz, 498 Pa. 639, 644, 450 A.2d 638, 641 (1982)
(discussing parent's duty to care for child); Westrup v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 95,
97, 93 S.W. 646, 646 (1906) (noting husband's duty to summon medical aid for wife
who is helpless); State v. Benton, 38 Del. 1, 15, 187 A. 609, 615 (1936) (discussing
duty of railroad gatekeeper to vehicle drivers to lower gate when train is approach-
ing).
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from whom the child needs to be protected. 4 Attributing
responsibility in such situations raises issues of social power:
What are the options of a woman with a violent partner? Can
she protect the child? 5 Are the limited financial resources
of many single women the root cause of the facts leading to a
neglect case? The attribution of responsibility can be clouded
by gender differentials in power and options even when the
mother is the abuser:
[D]efending women against violence is so urgent that
we fear women's loss of status as political, deserving
"victims" if we acknowledge women's own aggressions
Indeed, child abuse becomes the more inter-
esting and challenging to a feminist because in it we
meet women's rage and abuses of power. Further-
more, child abuse [here failure to act to protect a child
against abuse or neglect] is a gendered phenomenon,
related to the oppression of women, whether men or
women are the culprits, because it reflects the sexual
division of the labour of reproduction .... [W]omen
are always implicated because even when men are the
culprits, women are usually the primary caretakers
who have been, by definition, in some ways unable to
protect the children. When protective organizations
remove children or undertake supervision of their
caretakers, women often suffer greatly, for their
maternal work is usually, trying as it may be, the
most pleasurable part of their lives.66
Criminalization of failure to act was the second most
64. See, e.g., People v. Lopez, 206 Cal. Rptr. 860, 862 (1984) (not officially
published); Palmer v. State, 223 Md. 341, 343, 164 A.2d 467, 468 (1960); State v.
Walden, 306 N.C. 466, 469-71, 475-77, 293 S.E.2d 780, 783-84, 786-87 (1982).
65. Erickson, Battered Mothers of Battered Children: Using our Knowledge of
Battered Women to Defend Them Against Charges of Failure to Act, 1A CURRENT
PERSPECTIVES IN PSYCHOLOGICAL, LEGAL & ETHICAL ISSUES 195 (forthcoming 1991).
66. Gordon, Feminism and Social Control: The Case of Child Abuse and Neglect,
in WHAT IS FEMINISM? 63, 68-69 (J. Mitchell & A. Oakley eds. 1986).
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frequently included topic in the survey (92.7%) and tied with
"reasonableness and gender" for the largest amount of time
(108 minutes).
K Gender Differentials in the Criminal Justice System
An array of items concerning gender differentials in the
operation of the criminal justice system were included in our
questionnaire, but these tended to be infrequently covered.
Only 13.5% of professors surveyed covered gender differentials
in sentencing standards; 17.3%, gender differentials in capital
punishment; 24.3%, treatment of victims and witnesses in the
criminal justice system; 19.9%, degrees of culpability of
accomplices, and 16.1%, prosecutorial discretion regarding who
to "turn" against whom. Those few professors who did cover
these topics spent an average of thirty minutes on sentencing
standards and capital punishment and an hour or more on
treatment of victim and witnesses, culpability of accomplices
and prosecutorial discretion in "turning."
Poor or nonexistent coverage in the casebook was offered
as a reason for omission by 20-25% of the sample, and an
additional 40-45% considered most of these items "not as
important" as others. Many (ranging from 30-42%), indicated
that these topics (including sentencing) belonged in another
course, such as criminal procedure or criminal justice.
However logical this division may seem, it excludes
important gender-related issues from the criminal law class.
The treatment of female victims and witnesses in rape cases,
for example, is extremely important. Prosecution of rape was
deterred for years by aggressive and demeaning treatment of
victims.67 Moreover, gender differences in sentencing stan-
67. See, e.g., Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the
Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12-15 (1977). Many states have passed "rape
shield" laws limiting inquiry into the victim's sexual history and have undertaken
evidentiary reforms or rethought legal concepts of rape and consent issues. See, e.g.,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-7 (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-14 to -15
(1985); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(D) (Baldwin 1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.210
(1989); W.Va. Code § 61-8B-1 (1989); see also Galven, Shielding Rape Victims in the
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dards were common. Although these differences generally
were assumed to favor women, 8 the difference frequently
disadvantaged them seriously. 9 Expectations of differential
sentencing can affect charging and plea bargaining, shaping
the criminal law in certain directions through its practice. For
these reasons, further research should study the criminal
procedure course in order to determine whether these topics
are, in fact, covered in criminal procedure, where many
criminal law teachers suggest they belong.
Culpability of accomplices presents an especially dis-
counted criminal law issue in that fully 60% of the 151
professors who do not cover it consider it relatively unimpor-
tant, while 15% would transfer it to another course. The myth
that female perpetrators are always under the control of
co-acting males would seem to be the essence of sexism, based
as it is on stereotypes of women's passivity. However, recent
attention to the issue of battered spouses should alert us to
the fact that for many women male domination and coercion
are not myths.7 ° The paradoxical quality of this topic may
State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763
(1986); Searles & Berger, supra note 48, at 28-29, 36 (table 8), 37 (table 9), 38 (table
10). But the reforms and their impact may be somewhat limited. Searles & Berger,
supra note 49, at 29; see also S. ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 80-91; J. MARSH, A. GEIST
& N. CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 106-07; Spohn & Homey, A Case of Unrealistic
Expectations: Rape Law Reform in Illinois (forthcoming, Criminal Justice Policy
Review, Vol. 3(4) (1990)).
68. See, e.g., Note, Sentencing Women: Equal Protection in the Context of
Discretionary Decisionmaking, 6 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 85-87 (1980) (authored by
Marianne Popier).
69. Until the 1970s, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania permitted
differential sentencing that disadvantaged women who were given indeterminate
sentences and held ineligible for earlier parole for good behavior or who were
sentenced mandatorily to the maximum for the crime. See, e.g., United States ex rel.
Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968) (holding unconstitutional a statute
requiring a woman to be sentenced to an indefinite term, potentially longer than the
maximum sentence for men for the same offense); State v. Chambers 63 N.J. 287, 307
A.2d 78 (1973) (holding statute requiring women to be sentenced to an indefinite term
where male offenders convicted of the same offense would be sentenced to minimum-
maximum term violated 14th amendment); Commonwealth v. Daniel, 430 Pa. 642,
243 A.2d 400 (1968) (holding that statutory requirement of longer prison sentences
for women than for men convicted of the same crime violates equal protection); see
also B. DECKER, THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 243-46 (3d ed. 1983).
70. Nicolette Parisi has discussed and presented data concerning the roles of
women and men in crime. Discussing prior sex-role studies, she concludes "[I]t is
impossible to discern the particular relationship of the female criminal -with her
partner. Whether females were subservient when acting in concert with males
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thus warrant its continued consideration in the criminal law
course.
L. Doctrine of Marital Duress
The assumption that a woman who commits a crime in the
presence of her husband was coerced by him presents a
dilemma familiar in other areas of law and public policy such
as pornography,7  statutory rape,7 2 or antenuptial con-
tracts.73  Although permitting an assumption of women's
dependency and submission to male direction infantilizes
women legally, an assumption of equal power, opportunity,
and choice may fly in the face of social and economic reality.
Empirically, wives often are economically dependent on their
husbands (even if both are employed) and do have less power
in relationships.74 Protective law is attractive, yet defining
the woman as powerless undercuts her agency and, moreover,
is not true in many cases.
Most of our sample do not teach the marital duress
theory; only one third cover the topic. Perhaps it seems
outmoded or unimportant; two thirds of those who did not
include marital duress gave "not important" as their reason.
Yet, as with culpability of spouses, the doctrine of marital
duress could be used to raise the issue of the legal responsi-
bility of women in a society that has formal goals of equality
cannot be determined. However, recent evidence ... consistently demonstrates that
the traditional image of females as accomplices of males is erroneous." Parisi,
Exploring Female Crime Patterns, in JUDGE, LAWYER, VICTIM, THIEF 111, 117-18 (N.
Rafter & E. Stanko eds. 1982) (citation omitted). Nicole Rafter and Elizabeth Stanko
discuss alternative images of women who are criminals. See JUDGE, LAWYER, VICTIM,
THIEF 2-4 (N. Rafter & E. Stanko eds. 1982).
71. See R. TONG, supra note 41, at 7-36 (discussing pornography in general).
72. See id. at 90-123 (discussing rape in general).
73. See W. WADLINGTON, DOMESTIC RELATIONS-CASES AND MATERIALS 1114-39
(1978) (discussing antenuptial contracting in general).
74. Karen DeCrow discusses the ways that women have been in a position of
economic dependency and unequal conjugal power and thus subject to coercion by
their husbands. See K. DECROW, SEXIST JUSTICE 156-184 (1974); see also J.
LIPMAN-BLUMEN, GENDER ROLES AND POWER 4-5 (1984); Gelles, Abused Wives: Why
Do They Stay?, 38 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 659 (1976); Gillespie, Who Has the Power?:
The Marital Struggle, 33 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 445, 445 (Aug. 1971).
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but empirically continues to see considerable economic
dependency of women.75
M. Prostitution
Prostitution and pornography typically involve the
commercial use of sexuality (usually women's) and are often
termed "victimless" crimes.76 With regard to law, prostitu-
tion and pornography present difficult choices between
protecting powerless women and respecting women's rights to
make decisions about the use of their bodies.77
Of course, some feminists have argued that laws against
prostitution and the selective enforcement of such laws did not
evolve to protect vulnerable women, but to proscribe women's
behavior, which was considered immoral and
role-inappropriate, while tacitly making allowances for the
behavior of male customers.7" Consequently, the question of
criminal sanctions on "johns" (male customers) can be viewed
as a gender-related issue. However, only one third of our
respondents cover the differential enforcement of the law
against prostitutes and their customers.
Elements of the crime of prostitution were covered by one-
quarter of the responding professors, while one-third covered
its vagueness. Whether or not prostitution should be
criminalized appears to be of more teaching interest than the
crime itself; almost half discussed criminalization.
75. See B. EHRENREICH, THE HEARTS OF MEN: AMERICAN DREAMS & THE FLIGHT
FROM COMMITMENT (1983); A. HOCHSCHILD & A. MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT:
WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME (1989).
76. See, e.g., G. GEIS, NOT THE LAW'S BUSINESS 2, 173-221 (1979) (discussing
prostitution as a "victimless" crime); Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26
STAN. L. REV. 1026, 1049 (1974) (citing pornography as an example of a "non-victim"
crime); cf Comment, Zoning and the First Amendment: A Municipality's Power to
Control Adult Use Establishments, 55 UMKC L. REV. 263, 268 (1987) (authored by
Virginia M. Giokaris) ("Notwithstanding recent judicial pronouncements, the attitude
persists in some circles that pornography is a 'victimless crime,' not worthy of severe
punishment such as imprisonment.").
77. Cf R. TONG, supra note 41, at 6-64; Cooper, Prostitution: A Feminist Analysis,
11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 99, 99 (1989).
78. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 77, at 101-08.
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Of those who did not cover prostitution-related topics, two
thirds or more gave as their reason in each case that these
were not important subjects. While feminists, as well as
others, may disagree on the appropriate social policy regarding
prostitution, feminists generally favor the decriminalization of
prostitution.79 As long as prostitution has not been decrimi-
nalized, however, it could profitably be included in the
criminal law course as an example of gender inequity. It
raises, as well, the general issue of the criminalization of
sexual behavior that is defined socially as deviant.
N. Pornography
Professors devoted little attention to pornography; less
than a quarter of the sample covered it. Of those who do not
cover pornography, 42% think it belongs in another course,
most commonly constitutional law, while 43% state that this
is not as important a topic as others.
Attempts to prosecute under obscenity laws declined after
the 1973 Miller decision. 0 Currently, the more visible legal
activity regarding pornography centers on a civil law approach
developed by Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, who
conceptualize pornography as a violation of women's civil
rights."' Other feminists oppose those efforts legally to re-
strict pornography. 2 As with prostitution, both groups of
79. See R. TONG, supra note 41, at 55. Feminists disagree, however, on how
prostitution should be regulated. Id. at 56-58; see also Freeman, The Feminist Debate
Over Prostitution Reform: Prostitutes' Rights Groups, Radical Feminists, and the
(Im)possibility of Consent, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 75 (1989-90).
80. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); see Project, An Empirical Inquiry into
the Effect of Miller v. California on the Control of Obscenity 52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 810,
866-67, 870-77 (1977)); see generally S. WALKER, supra note 37, at 235-36.
81. See, e.g., Dworkin, Pornography is a Civil Rights Issue for Women, 21 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 55 (1987-88); MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1985).
82. See, e.g., Nan Hunter and Sylvia Law, Brief amici curiae of Feminist
Anti-Censorship Task Force (F.A.C.T.), et al., American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut,
771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986),, reprinted in 21 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 69, 76-136 (1987-88); Vance, Pleasure and Danger: Toward a Politics of
Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER 1 (C. Vance ed. 1984); Blakely, Is One Woman's
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feminists tend to oppose criminalization of pornography,83
although they generally support enforcing of other laws that
might be violated in the production of pornography.
0. Premenstrual Syndrome (PMS)
PMS defense is a new legal doctrine. First presented in
England in 1981 (successfully) and in the U.S. in 1982
(inconclusively),' it makes the claim that biological and
psychological responses to the menstrual cycle are so powerful-
ly in control of some women's behavior that defendants who
suffer from PMS may have diminished responsibility for
criminal acts. Whether PMS may have such a strong relation-
ship to violent behavior is controversial in scientific circles.8"
Feminist responses to PMS defense also vary. Some argue
that women's very real health problems should be recognized
by the law. Others believe this construct perpetuates the
myth that women are irresponsible because of "raging hormon-
al imbalance," they consider PMS a suspect diagnosis and a
threat to the equal treatment of women.86
Sexuality Another Woman's Porno?, MS., Apr., 1985, at 37; Tong, Women, Pornogra-
phy, and Law, in 73 ACADEME 14, 18-20 (1987).
83. R. TONG, supra note 41, at 14-15.
84. Regina v. Smith, 1982 CRIM. L. REV. 531; People v. Santos, No. lk046229 (N.Y.
Kings Cty. Crim. Ct. filed Apr. 21, 1982). Santos was settled by plea bargain, so
although the PMS defense was proposed, it was not tested. See Chait, Premenstrual
Syndrome & Our Sisters in Crime: A Feminist Dilemma, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP.
267, 269-72 (1986) (discussing Santos).
85. For a leading statement of the medical case for PMS, see K. DALTON, THE
PREMENSTRUAL SYNDROME AND PROGESTERONE THERAPY (1984) F and J. ENDICOTT,
PREMENSTRUAL CHANGES, SYNDROMES, AND DISORDERS (1986) (a National Institute
of Mental Health publication, on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform), which discusses conceptual and methodological issues in the study of PMS.
Zimmerman, The Women's Health Movement: A Critique of Medical Enterprise and
the Position of Women, in ANALYZING GENDER: A HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
RESEARCH 422, 446-52 (B. Hess & M. Ferree eds. 1987) criticizes the imposition of
definitions of abnormality on women's bodily functions. J. WILLIAMS, PSYCHOLOGY
OF WOMEN: BEHAVIOR IN A BIOSOCIAL CONTEXT 125-26 (3d ed. 1987) reviews the
mixed evidence on the causes and effect of PMS, referring to "the protean nature of
the disorder."
86. For a thorough discussion of PMS, its scientific merit, and legal implications
from a feminist perspective, see Chait, supra note 84.
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PMS will probably come to be defined very narrowly. For
this and other reasons, use of the PMS defense to homicide,
assault, theft, or other crime is likely to be limited. Only 30%
of the responding professors cover PMS defense in their
criminal law course. Although responding professors most
commonly described the defense as unimportant, 34% cite its
absence from the textbook as a reason for failing to cover it in
class. Many criminal law books do cover the male-only XYY
syndrome,87 so the professors have available to them materi-
als on a subject that could profitably be compared to PMS in
considering defenses and mitigation.
P. Correcting Sex Discrimination
In addition to questions about specific topics, respondents
were asked a global question about their teaching of criminal
law: "Do you cover in the course ways that sex discrimination
in laws can be corrected?"
Only one fifth of our sample of criminal law professors
report that they address issues of sex discrimination in law
and how to correct that discrimination. Those who do, howev-
er, spend an average of an hour and a half, which is a signifi-
cant amount of time relative to other topics.
Some of those who do not cover the subject reported that
it was not well covered in the casebook (16.2%) or not as
important as other topics (30.4%). But a majority of the 148
who indicated a reason for noncoverage thought that it
belonged in another course, usually sex discrimination (or
women and law) or constitutional law, but also employment
discrimination and civil rights. Yet, as long as broad issues of
sex discrimination are excluded from the criminal law course,
areas of sex bias may remain unchallenged despite the
incorporation into the curriculum of issues such as spouse
abuse, which are of particular concern to women.
87. See, e.g., J. GOLDSTEIN, A. DERSHOWITZ & R. SCHWARTZ, CRIMINAL LAW:
THEORY AND PROCESS 1135-37 (1974); R. SINGER & M. GARDNER, CRIMES AND
PUNISHMENT: CASES MATERIALS, AND READINGS IN CRIMINAL LAW 923-24 (1989).
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III. PRIORITIES IN THE TEACHING OF CRIMINAL LAW
We have reviewed the coverage given to each gender-
related topic by responding professors. Now let us step back
and consider the whole. What are respondents' teaching
priorities? In Table 3, gender-related topics are ordered
according to the proportion of respondents who include the
topic in their class.
Rape-related topics are included most frequently. The
mistake of fact defense to rape (94.9%) and to statutory rape
(89.8%) are the first and third most commonly taught topics,
while the elements of the crimes of rape (86.3%) and statutory
rape (84.3%) are also in the top five. But the question of who
can be a victim of rape, which poses directly the issue of sex
discrimination, is not included as often (68.4%); it ranks only
ninth. The diminished-capacity defense (twelfth) and the
death penalty for rape (fourteenth) are further down the list.
Criminalization of failure to act, exemplified by child
neglect, ranks as the second most frequently taught gender-
related topic (92.7%). The killing of a fetus as homicide is also
among the most frequently taught topics (83.5%). These have
in common the protection of children or potential children.
However, these topics reflect different kinds of gender rele-
vance. Criminal child neglect involves prosecuting a woman
(or a man) for a perceived failure in the role of parent, while
feticide involves both a need to redress parental loss and a
need to protect a woman's reproductive capacity. Alternative-
ly, feticide laws may represent a state's affirmation of the
value of fetal life in an antiabortion context. If such is the
case, statutes prohibiting feticide and failure to act can be
clustered conceptually as child protection or can be seen to
involve the social control of women, who are perceived as
insufficiently protective of their offspring unless threatened
with legal intervention.
Self-defense by battered women falls into the most fre-
quently taught grouping of gender-related topics (81%). Other
issues related to conjugal violence are covered by two thirds of
responding professors. Coverage of conjugal violence repre-
sents an important modification of the criminal law curricu-
lum, reflecting increasing societal awareness of spouse abuse.
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The relationship between reasonableness and gender is a
general issue in criminal law. To what extent is the "reason-
able man" a gendered concept? Are typical male responses the
standard for judging behavior? Should they be? Inasmuch as
two thirds of respondents report that they address the issue of
"reasonableness and gender," we can conclude that
gender-consciousness has penetrated the criminal law curricu-
lum in an important way.
The topics summarized above are taught by two thirds or
more of responding professors. Abortion and the
criminalization of prostitution fall into the midrange of cover-
age, included in criminal law classes by approximately half of
survey respondents. Other prostitution-related topics are
covered by only a third of the sample at most. Topics associ-
ated with sexual and reproductive morality, closely connected
to cultural ideas about the social roles of women, have histor-
ically been targets of social control efforts. But in the last
twenty-five years, evolving doctrines of equal protection and
privacy have affected law in this area, transforming some of
these topics into constitutional issues."8 Although this trend
has its limits and has not affected laws on prostitution as
much as laws on abortion, attitudes have shifted away from
the legal regulation of sexual behavior through the criminal
law.89
Less likely to be included in the criminal law course are
issues touching on the common law doctrine of coverture. The
spousal-conspiracy doctrine (taught by 37.8%) and the marital-
duress doctrine (34.5%) turn on a wife's lack of autonomy.
The low frequency with which these doctrines are taught
suggests that the professors have dropped them from the
curriculum because they view the doctrines as no longer
relevant.
PMS defense is included in less than one third of criminal
law classes. Yet it raises significant sex-bias issues: the role
of biology in defining women; the credence granted to women's
descriptions of their bodily experiences; the social construction
of gender concepts, rooted more in stereotype than in empirical
88. See S. WALKER, supra note 37, at 300-04.
89. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989), and Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), may mark a significant reversal of this trend.
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evidence; the danger to equality in differentiating men's and
women's legal responsibility; and the feminist dilemma of a
protective versus an empowering stance toward vulnerable
women. As a novel defense which does not appear to be
gaining widespread acceptance, the PMS defense could be
ignored with a certain degree of justification. It also could be
used effectively, however, to address various sex discrimi-
nation issues that are sure to arise for the practicing lawyer.
At the bottom of the list, covered by one quarter or less of
the responding professors, are topics signaling sex bias in the
operation of the criminal justice system. Given a premise that
the law is not simply what exists on the books, but what
happens in the legal system, failing to cover sex bias in the
actual operation of the criminal law is a significant vacuum in
classroom presentations. A survey of professors who teach
criminal procedure rather than criminal law may need to be
conducted to determine whether these topics are in fact
covered, but in another course.
Pornography also is covered infrequently (by 21.8%).
Sexual harassment is least frequently taught, addressed by
only 10% of responding professors but because of confusion
over defining the concept, it is difficult to draw any conclu-
sions.
IV. VARIATION IN TOPICAL COVERAGE BY SEX
AND LENGTH OF TEACHING CAREER
We hoped to learn from the survey whether variation
exists in the coverage of gender-related topics in different
teaching settings and whether variation is associated with
certain characteristics of the professor.9 °
90. Comparisons in Tables 5, 6, 7, 9, and 11 are presented as simple percentages,
with no claim as to the statistical significance of these comparisons. Significance
tests are inappropriate for this exploratory study based on a nonrandom sample. R.
HENKEL, TESTS OF SIGNIFICANCE 76-88 (1976); Lipset, Trow & Coleman, Statistical
Problems, in THE SIGNIFICANCE TEST CONTROVERSY 81 (D. Morrison & R. Henkel eds.
1970); Kendall, Note on Significance Tests, in THE SIGNIFICANCE TEST CONTROVERSY,
supra, at 87; Labovitz, The Nonutility of Significance Tests: The Significance of Tests
of Significance Reconsidered, 13 PAC. Soc. REV. 141, 141 (1970) Morrison & Henkel,
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A. Sex of Professor
Although assuming one-to-one correspondence between sex
and legal philosophy would be simple-minded, one of the
arguments for ensuring the participation of women and
minorities in a profession is that they may bring to it an
experience-based sensitivity to limitations of the established
perspective. Thus, it would be informative to determine
whether women address some or all gender-related topics to
a greater extent than do men.
Table 4 presents the gender-related topics ordered by ratio
of male-to-female coverage.91 In Table 4, numbers larger
than 1.000 signal topics more likely to be covered by male
professors, while numbers less than 1.000 indicate those more
frequently covered by female professors.
In examining sex differences, we must remember that as
a consequence of the history of the profession, sex and length
of career are overlapping categories; all but one of the women
have been teaching law less than ten years. On the one hand,
this convergence can be viewed as an interpretive problem,
confounding the effects of two separate variables, which we
disentangle in Table 5. On the other hand, one can argue that
it is artificial to separate these attributes in the analysis,
because they occur together in the empirical setting we wish
to understand.92 It is this conjunction of factors which
shapes contemporary law schools and their teaching of
gender-related topics.
As Table 4 indicates, the topic most likely to be covered by
women but not men is the ways in which sex discrimination in
Significance Tests in Behavioral Research: Pessimistic Conclusions and Beyond, in
THE SIGNIFICANCE TEST CONTROVERSY, supra, at 305. Measures of association would
be distorted by skewed distributions on many of the variables, see H. REYNOLDS,
ANALYSIS OF NOMINAL DATA 50 (1977), and would add little information beyond that
provided by inspection of the percentages.
The tables presented in this Article describe in a straightforward way the
patterns of response found in this survey. No statistical inference is made to the
entire population of criminal law professors, but these data do provide initial
information about the coverage of gender-related topics by criminal law professors in
varied social circumstances.
91. Table 11, in Appendix A, presents a topic-by-topic comparison of coverage by
male and female respondents.
92. See H. BLUMER, SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM 27 (1969).
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TABLE 4





Gender: Culpability of accomplices 3.695
Prosecutorial discretion: "Turning" 3.140
Conspiracy between spouses 2.124
Sexual harassment 2.107
Rape: Diminished-capacity defense 1.867
Marital duress 1.653
Prostitution: Vagueness 1.586
Rape: Potential victims 1.575
Prostitution: Sanctions on "johns" 1.545
Abortion 1.297
Prostitution: Criminizalization 1.221
Gender: Capital punishment 1.210
Pornography 1.205
Statutory rape: Elements 1.197
Rape: Death penalty 1.097
Rape: Elements 1.082
Killing of fetus as homicide 1.048
Wife's misconduct as provocation 1.032
Gender: Treatment of victims/witnesses 1.008
Statutory rape: Mistake-of-fact defense .980
Rape: Mistake-of-fact defense .972
PMS defense .967
Failure to act .913
Self-defense by battered women .894
Battering by spouses .835
Reasonableness and gender .805
Gender: Sentencing standards .754
Ways to correct sex discrimination in laws .720
'Ratio of % of male law professors who cover the topic to the % of female professors
who cover the topic.
laws can be corrected. Although only a minority of either sex
takes this critical perspective on criminal law, women are
almost 40% more likely (28.6%) than men (20.6%) to do so.
The difference between women professors and junior male
professors is smaller (29.4% compared to 24.1%).
93
93. Percentages for women are slightly different because this comparison is taken
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Women are also more likely to cover the important con-
ceptual issue of reasonableness and gender (80.0% compared
to 64.4%). Moreover, more women than men professors have
incorporated spouse abuse into their criminal law course
(80.6% compared to 67.3%). They are more likely to include
both battering by spouses and self-defense by battered women
(88.9% compared to 79.5%).
Gender differentials in the criminal justice system are not
systematically included by one sex more than the other, but
there are sharp differences on individual items. Although nei-
ther group is very likely to cover these topics, women profes-
sors are more likely than men (17.1% compared to 12.9%) to
cover gender differences in sentencing standards. Male
professors are more than three times as likely to cover gender
differences in culpability of accomplices (21.8% compared to
5.9%), in prosecutorial discretion in "turning" (17.9% compared
to 5.7%), and are slightly more likely to cover gender differenc-
es in capital punishment (17.3% compared to 14.3%). There
is little difference in coverage of treatment of victims and wit-
nesses (24.4% compared to 24.2%).
Men are almost five times more likely than women to
cover elements of the crime of prostitution (27.9% compared to
5.6%). They are generally more likely than women to cover
laws concerning sexual conduct-prostitution, abortion,
pornography, and statutory rape. In the case of abortion,
senior male professors are especially more likely than women
to cover the topic (63.6% compared to 40.0%).14 Men are also
much more likely to include the topic of criminal sanctions
against male customers of prostitutes (34.3% compared to
22.2%).
Male professors more frequently include the topics of
marital duress (36.7% compared to 22.2%) and conspiracy
between spouses (41.2% to 19.4%). In fact, men cover more of
the topics listed in the survey than do women; there are
twenty topics more likely to be covered by men, compared with
nine that are included more frequently by women.
from Table 5, which did not include the female responding professor who has taught
more than 10 years.
94. See Table 5, infra p. 229.
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Several of these twenty topics relate to rape. Most nota-
bly, men more frequently cover who can be a victim of rape
(72.0% compared to 45.7%),95 and men are also almost twice
as likely as women to cover the diminished-capacity defense
(57.1% compared to 30.6%).
B. Length of Criminal Law Teaching Career
I
The survey asked responding professors several questions
about the length of their legal careers: year of graduation from
law school; number of years spent teaching law; number of
years teaching criminal law; and length of criminal law
practice. Many respondents are experienced teachers of law.
Almost one quarter have taught for over fifteen years, another
50% for more than five years, 27.3% for six to ten years, and
26.5% for eleven to fifteen years. Less than 10% have taught
law only one or two years.
Careers in criminal law vary in length, but on the whole
have been shorter. Over 40% of the respondents have taught
criminal law for less than five years, including 19% who have
taught it for only one to two years. Careers in practice have
been rather limited: five years or less for three quarters of the
respondents.
We need to recall that women law professors have had
shorter teaching careers, with only one woman in the survey
teaching for more than ten years. Consequently, to disentan-
gle the relationship between sex and seniority, we have
divided our sample into three groups: (1) men who have taught
criminal law for more than ten years; (2) men who have
taught criminal law for less than ten years; and (3) women
who have taught criminal law for less than ten years.96
95. Although rape law reform has moved in the direction of gender neutrality, some
feminists oppose this trend. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. They fear
that protection of women, the most frequent victims of rape, will be deemphasized,
and they argue that "[w]hen women are the victims, gender is an issue that should
not be avoided." S. ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 82; see also R. TONG, supra note 41, at
91; Williams, supra note 2, at 187.
96. Because no pattern could be inferred from a single case, the data from the
woman respondent who has taught for more than 10 years was not included in this
228
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Table 5 presents data on the relationship between sex,
length of time respondents have taught criminal law, and
topical coverage. Once the effects of sex and length of service
TABLE 5
PERCENTAGE COVERING GENDER-RELATED CRIMINAL LAW TOPICS
BY YEARS TAUGHT CRIMINAL LAW AND BY SEX
Years Taught Criminal Law
1-10 11 or more
Female Male Male
Topic (N=35)* (N=121)b (N=78) c
Killing of Fetus as homicide 82.9 80.9 89.7
Abortion 40.0 48.3 63.6
Conspiracy between spouses 20.0 40.7 43.2
Battering by spouses 80.0 69.2 65.4
Self-defense by battered women 88.6 78.5 82.1
Reasonableness and gender 79.4 61.7 66.7
Wife's misconduct as provocation 66.6 66.9 67.6
Rape: Elements 80.0 83.1 94.8
Rape: Mistake-of-fact defense 97.1 93.3 97.4
Rape: Diminished-capacity defense 31.4 53.0 64.4
Rape: Death penalty 42.9 48.3 50.1
Rape: Potential victims 44.1 66.9 81.3
Statutory rape: Elements 71.4 83.5 92.3
Statutory rape: Mistake-of-fact defense 91.4 87.5 94.9
Sexual harassment 5.7 12.7 10.5
Failure to act 100.0 91.5 92.3
Gender: Sentencing standards 17.6 12.8 13.2
Gender: Capital punishment 14.7 19.3 14.4
Gender: Treatment of victims/witnesses 25.0 21.2 29.9
Gender: Culpability of accomplices 6.1 19.3 26.0
Prosecutor discretion: "Turning" 5.9 19.3 16.0
Marital duress 22.9 33.3 42.9
Prostitution: Elements 2.9 28.6 28.2
Prostitution: Criminalization 37.1 53.3 39.7
Prostitution: Vagueness 20.0 40.0 19.5
Prostitution: Sanctions on "johns" 22.9 34.4 35.1
Pornography 5.9 23.1 25.0
PMS defense 28.6 33.9 24.4
Ways to correct sex discrimination in laws 29.4 24.1 15.6
'Not every respondent answered every item. Ns range from 32-35.
bNs range from 116-121.
'Ns range from 73-78.
analysis. She turned out to be Marina Angel, one of the Project Panel members. See
supra note t. Her reflections on what it is like to be one of the first women law
teachers is very worthy of attention. See Angel, Women in Legal Education: What
Its Like to be Part of a Perpetual First Wave or the Case of the Disappearing Women,
61 TEMPLE L. REV. 799 (1988).
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are separated, few relationships between length of criminal
law teaching career and inclusion of the various
gender-related topics remain.
The topic of abortion, however, demonstrates such a
difference. Less than 50% of men and women who have
taught for fewer than ten years cover abortion, while close to
two thirds of men who have taught for eleven or more years do
include abortion. Because abortion largely was decriminalized
by the decision in Roe v. Wade,97 more recently trained
lawyers may not consider it necessary to include abortion in
a criminal law course. More senior professors may continue
to include it.
Elements of rape are frequently included by all groups,
but coverage by senior professors is almost universal (94.8%).
They are also more likely to cover elements of statutory rape
(92.3% compared to 83.5% of more male junior professors and
71.4% of female professors). This may represent simply a
change in typical teaching method, although a sex difference
is also apparent here.
Finally, professors who have been teaching criminal law
for a shorter time are more likely than senior professors to
include the umbrella topic "ways to correct sex discrimination
in law" than more senior professors. This finding is not
surprising, because the notions that the social bases of law
and the uneven distribution of social power might be part of
the law school curriculum are relatively new98 in legal education.'
97. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). But see Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S.
490 (1989) (holding that certain restrictions on abortion were not unconstitutional).
Webster may be viewed as a departure from cases such as Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (striking down a
Pennsylvania informed consent statute) and City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (striking down an ordinance making
it a misdemeanor to perform an abortion without obtaining informed consent).
98. With few exceptions, critical legal studies articles have publication dates in the
mid- to late-seventies or later. See Kennedy & Klare, A Bibliography of Critical
Legal Studies, 94 YALE L.J. 461, 464-90 (1984). Also, younger professors may have
received their undergraduate education during a period of curricular interest in social
problems: that is, from the mid- sixties through the early seventies.
99. Table 5 disaggregates length of service and sex, permitting a few further





Situational characteristics investigated in this survey are:
(1) perceived existence of a sex-based discrimination course in
the law school curriculum; (2) perceived percentage of women
students at the law school; and (3) perceived polarization of
male and female students on the various topics.
A. Sex Discrimination Course
Table 6 presents data on coverage of gender-related topics
by whether responding professors believe their school offers a
sex-discrimination course. Data are presented separately for
women and men; men are more likely (68.9% compared to
55.6%) than women to report that they teach at a school
offering a sex discrimination course. 00 It is important to
note that we included as "yes" responses in Tables 1 and 6
some individuals whose colleagues report that the school does
not have a sex-based discrimination course. It may say
something about the visibility of sex discrimination courses
that eleven respondents (all male) did not know whether or
not such a course was taught at their school and that an
additional sixteen respondents contradicted others from the
same school on this point.
More junior male professors occupy an intermediate position between female
professors and senior males regarding inclusion of several topics, e.g., who can be a
victim of rape, diminished-capacity defense to rape, and marital duress. As to
coverage of some other topics, female professors and longer-serving males are similar
in the frequency with which they include a topic, while junior male professors are
distinct. Junior males are most likely to cover the following topics: gender differences
in capital punishment, criminalization of prostitution, vagueness of prostitution laws,
and PMS defense. Junior males are least likely to cover gender differences in
treatment of victims and witnesses in the criminal justice system.
100. Because Table 1 included "don't know" responses, percentages differ
slightly.
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TABLE 6
COVERAGE OF GENDER-RELATED TOPICS
BY WHETHER OR NOT SCHOOL OFFERS A SEX DISCRIMINATION COURSE
AND BY SEX OF PROFESSOR
% Covering Topic
Male Female
Course No Course No
Course Course
Topic (N=124)' (N=56) (N=20) (N=16)
Killing of fetus as homicide 84.7 78.6 75.0 87.5
Abortion 53.7 58.2 45.0 37.5
Conspiracy between spouses 41.3 45.3 15.0 25.0
Battering by spouses 71.3 63.6 90.0 68.8
Self-defense by battered women 79.8 80.4 95.0 81.3
Reasonableness and gender 69.2 49.1 94.7 62.5
Wife's misconduct as provocation 64.7 67.3 73.7 53.3
Rape: Elements 86.1 90.7 85.0 75.0
Rape: Mistake-of-fact defense 93.5 98.2 95.0 100.0
Rape: Diminished-capacity defense 50.8 73.6 40.0 18.8
Rape: Death penalty 53.3 43.4 35.0 56.3
Rape: Potential victims 70.2 79.2 42.1 50.0
Statutory rape: Elements 84.7 90.9 70.0 75.0
Statutory rape: Mistake-of-fact defense 88.6 94.5 90.0 93.8
Sexual harassment 9.9 14.8 5.0 6.3
Failure to act 91.8 89.1 100.0 100.0
Gender: Sentencing standards 9.9 14.8 31.6 0.0
Gender: Capital punishment 17.9 13.2 21.1 6.3
Gender: Treatment of victims/witnesses 26.0 20.4 41.2 6.3
Gender: Culpability of accomplices 21.0 25.9 5.6 6.3
Prosecutorial discretion: "Turning" 19.7 15.1 10.2 0.0
Marital duress 35.5 38.2 25.0 18.8
Prostitution: Elements 25.4 38.2 10.0 0.0
Prostitution: Criminalization 47.5 48.2 60.0 12.5
Prostitution: Vagueness 35.0 41.1 30.0 12.5
Prostitution: Sanctions on "johns" 31.1 39.3 35.0 6.3
Pornography 19.5 31.5 15.0 0.0
PMS defense 34.1 25.0 35.0 25.0
Ways to correct sex discrimination in laws 23.3 22.2 36.8 18.8
aNot all respondents answered all questions. N's ranged from 117-124 for male/yes;
53-56 for male/no; 17-20 for female/yes and 15-16 for female/no.
We asked about sex-discrimination courses because we
suspected that the availability of these courses might provide
a rationale for not covering gender-related topics in other
courses, effectively ghettoizing such topics. Whether his law
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school offers a sex discrimination course seems to make little
difference, however, in much of the topical content of a male
professor's criminal law class. Of those teaching at schools
with a sex-discrimination course, for example, 23.3% cover
ways that sex bias in laws can be corrected, while of those who
teach at schools without such a course, 22.2% cover that topic.
There are a few exceptions. Men teaching at a school with
a sex-discrimination course are much less likely (19.5%
compared to 31.5%) to include pornography in their courses.
They are less likely to cover elements of the crime of prostitu-
tion (25.4% to 38.2%) and the diminished-capacity defense to
rape (50.8% to 73.6%). They are more likely, however, to
include the important topic of gender and reasonableness
(69.2% to 49.1%) and slightly more likely to cover PMS defense
(34.1% to 25.0%). These topics represent: (1) recently articu-
lated feminist issues (reasonableness, legal responsibility for
rape, PMS defense) or (2) decriminalization of so-called
victimless crimes involving the social control of women's
sexuality through the criminal law. 1° ' We can speculate that
teaching at a school with a sex-discrimination course may
heighten male professors' awareness of a feminist perspective
on the law in some important areas.
Presence or absence of a sex-discrimination course seems
to have a stronger effect on women's coverage of
gender-related topics. On eighteen of twenty-nine topics there
is at least a ten percentage point difference in coverage
between women teaching at schools with and without a sex-
bias course, and often the difference is much larger than that.
Women teaching at schools that offer a sex-discrimination
course are more apt to cover two key topics regarding sex bias:
ways to correct sex discrimination in laws (36.8% compared to
18.8%) and reasonableness and gender (94.7% to 62.5%).
At a school with a sex discrimination course, female
professors more often also cover spousal battering as a crimi-
nal offense (90.0% to 68.8%) and related issues such as
self-defense by battered women (95.0% compared to 81.3%)
and reasonableness and gender (94.7% to 62.5%). Additional-
ly, they are more likely to include other topics that have to do
101. Although feminists are divided on their legal approach to pornography and
prostitution between a protective and an individual choice stance, there is strong
support for decriminalizing women's commercial sexual activity. See R. TONG, supra
note 41, at 55; DuBois & Gordon, Seeking Ecstasy in the Battlefield: Danger and
Pleasure in Nineteenth Century Feminist Sexual Thought, in PLEASURE AND DANGER,
supra note 82, at 31; Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics
of Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER, supra note 82, at 267.
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with gender and violence: wife's misconduct as provocation
(73.7% compared to 53.3%) and PMS defense (35.0% to 25.0%).
Several topics related to gender differentials in the
operation of the criminal justice system are covered more
frequently by women teaching at a school with a sex discrimi-
nation course: gender differences in sentencing (31.6%
compared to 0%); gender differences in the treatment of
victims and witnesses (41.2% compared to 6.3%); and gender
differences in capital punishment (21.1% compared to 6.3%).
Women are less apt to cover the now virtually abolished death
penalty for rape if they are at a school with a sex-discrimina-
tion course (35.0% compared to 56.3%).
For topics that are traditional specifications of crimes or
defenses to them, the effect of teaching at a school with a sex-
discrimination course differs for men and women. Women
teaching at a law school with this course more frequently
(40.0%) include the diminished-capacity defense to rape than
do women at schools without such a course (18.8%), while the
opposite is true for men (50.8% and 73.6%). Women at schools
with a sex-discrimination course are respectively less likely to
cover conspiracy between spouses, although it makes little
difference to men's coverage of this topic.
At a school with a sex-discrimination course, women are
more likely to cover some topics related to prostitution:
criminalization of prostitution (60.0% compared to 12.5%);
vagueness (30.0% compared to 12.5%); prosecution of "johns"
(35.0% compared to 6.3%). For males, it makes no difference
whether there is a sex-discrimination course for coverage of
criminalization, while they are less likely to cover vagueness
and prosecution of "johns" at a school with a sex-discrimina-
tion course. Male professors at a school without a sex-dis-
crimination course and female professors at schools with such
a course are more likely than their counterparts to cover
pornography (31.5% compared to 19.5% and 15.0% compared
to 0% respectively).
These differential patterns of coverage could result from
different content of coverage. A professor can cover
prostitution-related topics without questioning the assumption
that prostitution is a crime, for example, or cover them
critically, pointing out that the law functions as a social
control device directed toward the sexuality of women. One
might ascribe traditional reasons to professors with charac-
teristics presumed to be more traditional (male, longer ca-
reers, teaching at a school without a sex-discrimination
course) and feminist or critical reasons to professors with
characteristics presumed to be less traditional (female,
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younger professors, teaching at schools with sex-discrimination
courses). This would explain why certain items are covered
most frequently by men at schools without a sex-discrimina-
tion course (most traditional) and women at schools with a
sex-discrimination course (most critical). Because no data on
course content were collected, these inferences are purely
speculative. It is less plausible to conclude that having a sex-
discrimination course in place at a law school somehow causes
women to be more traditional in their coverage.
Overall, one can conclude that if a sex-based discrimi-
nation course has any general effect, it is to encourage a
feminist or critical perspective on the law in other parts of the
curriculum. Rather than drawing off issues of sex bias from
required core classes, sex-discrimination courses seem to
create a climate in which broad issues of sex bias will be
addressed throughout the curriculum.
In reaching this conclusion, we note that there could be
other explanations for this association between existence of a
sex-discrimination course and coverage of gender-related
topics in a criminal law course. There may be something
about the overall character of the law school, its intellectual
and political climate, or its size and resources, that encourages
both a sex-discrimination course and a critical or feminist
perspective on the criminal law. It is also possible that the
criminal law and sex-discrimination courses might be taught
by the same person, giving them a commonality of perspective.
We did not, however, ask respondents whether they also
taught a sex discrimination course. It is worthy noting that
most teachers of sex-discrimination courses are female, 2 so
if a criminal-law teacher also teaches sex discrimination, that
teacher is likely to be female.
B. Perceived Percentage of Women Students
We considered that the presence of women in the class-
room might affect professors' treatment of gender-related
topics: certain issues might be made salient; comments and
questions of women students might suggest avenues of inqui-
ry, require consideration of feminist legal perspectives, or in
other ways redirect the focus of learning.
10 3
102. C. EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 233-35.
103. Assuming that sex determines philosophy and politics would be simplistic.
Nevertheless, differences of socialization and advantage linked to sex, as well as-
FALL 1990] 235
236 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 24:1
Table 7 presents data on the coverage of gender-related
topics by perceived percentage of women law students.
TABLE 7
COVERAGE OF GENDER-RELATED CRIMINAL LAW TOPICS
BY PERCEIVED PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN STUDENTS
% Covering Topic When % Female Enrollment Is...
20-34% 35-44% Over 45%
Topic (N=44)* (N=124)" (N=66)'
Killing of fetus as homicide 93.2 87.1 72.7
Abortion 52.3 55.5 47.0
Conspiracy between spouses 40.5 36.1 39.7
Battering by spouses 69.8 69.7 70.1
Self-defense by battered women 81.8 80.6 81.9
Reasonableness and gender 59.5 73.0 62.5
Wife's misconduct as provocation 51.1 63.0 83.9
Rape: Elements 88.6 89.3 81.5
Rape: Mistake-of-fact defense 100.0 94.2 92.4
Rape: Diminished-capacity defense 64.3 55.9 51.6
Rape: Death penalty 50.0 48.8 48.5
Rape: Potential victims 70.0 69.5 66.2
Statutory rape: Elements 90.9 84.7 81.9
Statutory rape: Mistake-of-fact defense 90.9 90.2 90.8
Sexual harassment 9.5 12.3 9.2
Failure to act 93.0 95.0 89.4
Gender: Sentencing standards 9.5 16.4 9.7
Gender: Capital punishment 18.6 17.2 15.9
Gender: Treatment of victims/witnesses 27.9 28.3 15.6
Gender: Culpability of accomplices 9.3 23.1 18.8
Prosecutorial discretion: "Turning" 13.6 16.8 16.9
Marital duress 27.9 35.8 36.5
Prostitution: Elements 25.0 23.6 27.7
Prostitution: Criminalization 52.2 43.4 47.0
Prostitution: Vagueness 40.9 29.3 37.9
Prostitution: Sanctions on "johns" 26.6 33.3 33.8
Pornography 27.3 21.5 18.2
PMS defense 27.3 30.1 33.3
Ways to correct sex discrimination in laws 22.7 23.5 19.0
'Not all respondents answered all questions. Ns ranged from 42-44 (for 20-34%
female student body); 118-124 (35-44%); 62-66 (over 45%).
other differences in experience, certainly suggest that a mixed classroom would differ
from a male-only or male-dominated class because men and women are likely to differ
in consciousness of bias. See Goode, Why Men Resist, in RETHINKING THE FAMILY:
SOME FEMINIST QUESTIONS 131, 137 (B. Thorne & M. Yalom ed.1982); cf. Brod,
Toward Men's Studies, in CHANGING MEN 263, 272-75 (M. Kimmel ed. 1987).
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There were some differences, but little overall tendency for
coverage of gender-related topics to increase or decrease
linearly with perceived percentage of women in the student
body.
Several topics were less frequently covered where there
were more women students: diminished-capacity defense to
rape (64.3% of those teaching in law schools with a female
enrollment of 20-34% compared to 51.6% in schools with an
enrollment of over 45%); elements of the crime of statutory
rape (90.9% compared to 81.9%); gender differences in treat-
ment of victims and witnesses (27.9% compared to 15.6%); and
pornography (27.3% compared to 18.2%). Gender differences
in culpability (9.3% of responding professors teaching in law
schools with a female enrollment of 20-34% compared to 18.8
% in schools with over 45% female enrollment) and wife's
misconduct as provocation (51.1% compared to 83.9%) were
covered more frequently with a stronger presence of women in
the classroom. These differences are not easily explained; the
particulars of coverage and perhaps the nature of the specific
law school may account for the patterns. It is interesting that
the perceived proportion of women in the student body makes
virtually no difference in coverage of "ways to correct sex
discrimination in laws."
Even harder to explain are several curvilinear relation-
ships, where the middle category of 35-44% female enrollment
is set off slightly from those with fewer or more women
students. For example, almost three quarters of professors at
schools that are 35-44% female cover "reasonableness and
gender," while only around 60% of those at other schools do so.
Middle-range schools are also slightly more likely to cover
gender differences in sentencing and less likely to cover
"vagueness" of the laws of prostitution.
Data not included here suggest that it is schools with
fewer than 30% women that are distinctive. Thirty percent
may be a critical mass of women that supports certain kinds
of coverage of gender-related criminal law topics. Schools with
fewer than 30% women are also least likely to have a sex-
discrimination course. But only eleven schools had fewer than
30% women in 1985,1°4 which is why the categories are col-
lapsed in Table 7. It may be that the distinctive features of
law schools with small female enrollments are due to idiosyn-
104. See 1985 REVIEW OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 22, at 4-62.
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crasies of the individual schools that represent essentially
random variation.
C. Perceived Polarization of Male and Female Students
Theory and experience in other settings suggest that male
and female students might polarize in response to presenta-
tion of gender-related topics." 5 Professors were not asked
directly whether perceived class polarization would influence
their coverage, but they were questioned as to what polariza-
tion they perceived in response to presentation of the various
gender-related topics-
Table 8 orders topics by the degree to which the total
sample perceives the topic to polarize male and female stu-
dents. Table 9 explores sex differences in the relationship
between perceived polarization and coverage. Unfortunately,
not all responding professors answered all the items; some
items received minimal response. Given the potential
unrepresentativeness of those who did respond, few firm
conclusions can be drawn. For example, although sexual
harassment was perceived to be the most divisive topic
(39.4%), only thirty-three responding professors answered this
question.
The most general observation is that relatively little
polarization is perceived. No topic is thought by a majority of
professors to polarize male and female students, and only four
topics are so perceived by more than 20% of respondents: and
sexual harassment (39.4%); mistake-of-fact defense to rape
(32.0%); ways that sex discrimination in law can be corrected
(28.6%); and self-defense by battered women (23.4%).
Comparing the perceptions of men and women professors
is actually the most interesting use of these data. We see
immediately from Table 9 that women professors are more
likely to report polarization-on twenty-two of the twenty-nine
topics-than men. (If we eliminate from consideration those
topics where fewer than ten women responded, the figure is
thirteen out of fourteen).
105. Goode, supra note 103, at 136-37 presents a sociology of subordinates to
explain "why men resist" perceiving and acknowledging women's disadvantage in
society. This theory suggests that men and women will have sharply divergent views
on gender-related issues. See also Aiken, Anderson, Dinnerstein, Lesnick &
MacCorquodale, Tying Transformations: Curriculum Integration and the Problem of
Resistance, in RECONSTRUCTING THE ACADEMY 104, 115-21 (E. Minnich, J. O'Barr &
R. Rosenfeld eds. 1988).
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TABLE 8
RANK ORDER OF GENDER-RELATED CRIMINAL LAW TOPICS
BY PERCEPTION OF POLARIZATION
AMONG MALE AND FEMALE STUDENTS
Topic Percentage Who Perceive Male/Female
Students to be Polarized by Topic
% N
Sexual harassment 39.4 (33)
Rape: Mistake-of-fact defense 32.0 (175)
Ways to correct sex discrimination in laws 28.6 (49)
Self-defense by battered women 23.4 (154)
Prostitution: Sanctions on "johns" 19.0 (63)
Reasonableness and gender 17.3 (127)
Battering by spouses 16.9 (142)
Rape: Elements 16.0 (156)
PMS defense 15.8 (57)
Rape: Potential victims 14.9 (121)
Abortion 13.4 (112)
Statutory rape: Mistake-of-fact defense 13.2 (152)
Wife's misconduct as provocation 13.1 (122)
Killing of fetus as homicide 12.6 (174)
Rape: Death penalty 11.6 (96)
Prostitution: Criminalization 11.5 (78)
Gender: Treatment of victims/witnesses 10.9 (55)
Rape: Diminished-capacity defense 10.8 (102)
Pornography 9.1 (44)
Statutory rape: Elements 8.8 (148)
Failure to act 8.2 (159)
Gender: Sentencing standards 7.1 (42)
Gender: Culpability of accomplices 7.0 (43)
Gender: Capital punishment 6.8 (44)
Marital duress 6.3 (63)
Prosecutorial discretion: "Turning" 5.1 (39)
Prostitution: Elements 4.3 (47)
Conspiracy between spouses 2.6 (78)
Prostitution: Vagueness 1.8 (57)
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TABLE 9
PERCEIVED POLARIZATION
OF M/F CRIMINAL LAW STUDENTS
BY TOPIC AND SEX OF PROFESSOR
Perceived Polarization
Male Female Ratio
% N % N F/M'




Self-defense by battered women
Reasonableness and gender












Gender: Treatment of victims/witnesses






Prostitution: Sanctions on "johns"
Pornography
PMS defense






























'Where female respondents number less than 10, ratios were not calculated. "M" or
"F" designates which is most likely to perceive polarization.
Topic
Sex-Bias Topics
How can this difference be explained? It could be a
consequence of women's societal training, which could make
them more likely to register emotional tension in the class-
room.0 6 We suspect, however, that class polarization over
gender-related issues is verbalized sufficiently so that it would
be hard to overlook. It thus seems probable that women
teachers report more polarization because in fact they are
more likely to experience it. Male students may be alert to
criticize female professors for what they view as antimale
attitudes or an obsession with sex bias. Moreover, female
professors are less protected by teaching authority. Social
psychological research indicates that in similar circumstances
male professionals are more likely than females to be favor-
ably evaluated and perceived as competent and authorita-
tive.'0 7 In the criminal law classroom, males' coverage of
gender-related topics may be viewed as legitimate and pro-
fessional, females' as political and inappropriate. Moreover,
students perceive female professors to be less authoritarian
than male professors.'O° They may be seen as more recep-
tive to student opinion, thus offering a forum for male and
female students to engage in conflict on gender-related as well
as other topics. Finally, women students, perceiving support
for feminist views from a woman professor, may more freely
express these views, making manifest a conflict of opinions
that might have remained latent in a male professor's class-
room.1
0 9
106. See A. SIMEONE, ACADEMIC WOMEN 54, 58-60, 73 (1987). Carol Gilligan
remarks on women's perception of the social world in terms of the "web of intercon-
nection" among people. C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 57 (1982).
107. See A. SIMEONE, supra note 106, at 62-66; J. GAPPA & B. UEHLING,
WOMEN IN ACADEME 59 (1979); Goebel & Cashen, Age, Sex, and Attractiveness as
Factors in Student Ratings of Teachers: A Developmental Study, 71 J. EDUC.
PSYCHOLOGY 646, 646 (1979); Pheterson, Kiesler, & Goldberg, Evaluation of the
Performance of Women as a Function of Their Sex, Achievement, and Personal History,
19 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 114, 116 (1971); Sapiro, If U.S. Senator Baker
Were A Woman: An Experimental Study of Candidate Images, 3 POL. PSYCHOLOGY
61, 64, 75 (1982). For a detailed report on difficulties faced by female professors in
their interaction with male students and faculty, see B. SANDLER WITH R. HALL,
CAMPUS CLIMATE REVISITED (1986) (a report of the Project on the Status and
Education of Women, Association of American Colleges, Washington, D.C.).
108. S. Bennett, Student Perceptions of and Expectations for Male and Female
Instructors: Evidence Relating to Gender Bias in Teaching Evaluations, 74 J. EDUC.
PSYCHOLOGY 170, 178 (1982). But see R. KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORA-
TION 302 (1977) (finding that "[i]ndividual differences were more striking than sex
differences" in determining leadership styles).
109. Karp & Yoels, The College Classroom: Some Observations on the
FALL 1[990]
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With regard to specific topics, criminalization of failure to
act produces the greatest male-female difference in perceived
polarization. Reasonableness and gender is also three times
more likely to be perceived as divisive by women professors.
Topics at least twice as likely to be perceived as polarizing by
female compared to male faculty include: killing of fetus as
homicide, self-defense by battered women, elements of
statutory rape, and criminalization of prostitution. Others
more likely to be perceived as polarizing by female than male
professors are: abortion, battering by spouses, elements of
rape, mistake-of-fact defense to rape, and who can be a victim
of rape.
Male faculty are more likely to report as divisive the issue
of wife's misconduct as provocation. Other issues on which
men report more polarization are responded to by so few
women that comparisons are suspect. Despite limited re-
sponse, it is worth noting that men and women report similar
high levels of polarization when covering ways that sex
discrimination in law can be corrected (27.9% and 28.6%).
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:
BRINGING THE CRIMINAL LAW CURRICULUM
INTO THE NINETIES
This survey of 238 criminal law professors provides basic
data on coverage of selected gender-related topics in the
criminal law course and on some variations in coverage
associated with professorial characteristics and teaching
situation.
A. Summary
A substantial majority of the responding professors agree
that it is important to teach the relationship between criminal
law and social and political concerns, although only one fifth
Meanings of Student Participation, in SOCIAL INTERACTION 187, 190 (C. Clark & H.
Robboy 3d ed. 1988) (finding that "[flemale student participation is maximized under
the influence of female professors").
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take the opportunity to do so by including "ways that sex
discrimination in law can be corrected."
Spouse abuse is typically included in a criminal law course
(70%). The important related issues of self-defense pleas to
spousal homicides committed in abusive situations (81%) and
of the relationship between reasonableness and gender (67%)
also are covered frequently.11 °
Doctrines of marital duress and conspiracy between
spouses, connected to outmoded concepts of wives' dependency
on husbands, have been dropped from the curriculum by a
large majority of professors. Crimes regulating sexual moral-
ity and representing the social control of women's sexuality
and reproductive capacity remain, although only abortion is
covered by more than 50% of respondents. Pornography and
topics related to prostitution are covered by substantial
minorities. Of course, we do not know how these topics are
presented when they are included. For that reason, the
significance of statistics on coverage of these and many other
topics is difficult to interpret. Topics can simply be presented
in traditional ways or they can be used to raise sex bias
issues.
Topics relating to gender differentials in the operation of
the criminal justice system are seldom covered by criminal law
professors. The vast majority of respondents believe that
these topics properly belong in a criminal procedure or sen-
tencing course.
B. Limitations of the Study
This report of data on coverage of gender-related topics in
the criminal law course needs to be qualified by noting some
limitations of the study:
1) The sample of 238 criminal law professors is sub-
stantial, but represents only 31% of those to whom the
questionnaire was sent. Although the range of social charac-
110. The topics of spouse abuse and self-defense by battered women were
covered by only one casebook apiece out of the seven casebooks surveyed in Erickson,
Final Report, supra note t. For comparisons between casebook reviews and
questionnaire results, see Final Report, supra note t, at 492-99.
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teristics of responding professors was broad and the proportion
of female responding professors approximated that of the total
population of criminal law teachers, we have no sure way of
knowing whether our respondents are representative. It may
be that those more sympathetic to the research purpose
responded. Response rates may have varied by type of law
school, length of career, or in some other way.
2) Respondents did not answer all of the questions,
particularly those toward the end of the questionnaire and
those involving perceived polarization. We have endeavored
to carefully call this limitation to the reader's attention where
response was particularly low.
3) Several questions, notably "wife's misconduct as
provocation" and "sexual harassment," were misunderstood by
some respondents. An intended question on marital rape was
inadvertently not included on the questionnaire.
4) With the exception of Table 5, which looks at sex and
length of teaching career simultaneously, we have examined
only first-order relationships among the variables, that is,
considered the effects of only one characteristic at a time on
the coverage of gender-related issues.
5) Because we did not develop a variable to indicate
global differences among law schools (in prestige, region,
sponsorship, age, legal philosophy, LSAT scores of students,
etc.), a variable that would be difficult to construct, we did not
consider the ethos of the law school as a possible influence on
topical coverage. It may be that apparent associations be-
tween coverage of gender-related topics and sex of professor,
length of professor's criminal law teaching career, sex compo-
sition of the student body, existence of a sex-discrimination
course, and classroom polarization over gender-related topics
simply reflect the general tendency of a law school toward
innovation or conservatism.
6) The fact of coverage does not reveal enough about the
content of coverage. We can read coverage of a traditional
topic like marital duress to represent a legal perspective that
reflects traditional views on gender roles, but this topic could
also be taught so as to challenge bias and raise consciousness.
It is easy enough to ascribe a progressive point of view to the
teaching of new topics like spouse abuse, but difficult to infer
the perspective from which more traditional topics are taught.
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C. Conclusion
Although the survey did not address specifically the
question of how gender-related topics are taught, we hope that
this systematic review of gender-related topics will stimulate
discussion and reflection leading to curricular modification. It
should increase awareness of how many criminal law topics,
as they are traditionally taught, imply social roles for women
that no longer are accepted widely."1
Law is shaped by its practice, and practice by the educa-
tion of the practitioner. As part of the general evolution of
rights in recent decades, we have become aware of the way in
which sex bias in the criminal law has disadvantaged women
(and sometimes men). The legal theories and practical appli-
cations to which our law faculty and graduates are committed
will ordain, to a great extent, the future course the law will
take in determining which behaviors are criminalized, how the
criminal justice system treats men and women, and whether
judgments of guilt or innocence take account of the sometimes
different circumstances of men's and women's lives.
Analyzing the relationship of gender and law may be of
interest to the criminal law professor for several reasons.
Exploring the relationship between law and society is a
significant intellectual concern. Feminist legal theory, which
is receiving considerable attention as it is incorporated into
the law school curriculum, is one manifestation of this
interest.1 2 Moreover, teaching will be more effective where
student interest and understanding are increased by taking
into account the social experience of all students, women and
men. Finally, legal doctrines or case examples that raise
issues of gender can illuminate the basic concepts of the
criminal law in useful ways." 3 In a teaching context in
111. Numerous sources describe changing roles for women. See, e.g., S.
MCLAUGHLIN, B. MELBER, J. BILLY, D. ZIMMERLE, L. WINGES & T. JOHNSON, THE
CHANGING LIVES OF AMERICAN WOMEN (1988); WOMEN: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE (J.
Freeman 4th ed. 1989).
112. "'I think it's the most interesting intellectual movement in law in quite
some time,' said Geoffrey Stone, dean of the University of Chicago law school," quoted
in Lewin, For Feminist Scholars, Second Thoughts on Law and Order, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 30, 1988, at B9, col. 3.
113. A major thrust of a previous work is to demonstrate to professors and
authors of casebooks how gender-related topics may be excellent vehicles for teaching
central issues of criminal law in challenging, innovative ways. See Erickson, Final
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which female (and male) students are keenly aware of bias in
law and in presentation of the law, educational interests are
often best served by directly addressing issues of sex bias.
Report, supra note t. It makes concrete suggestions, using both traditional cases and
newer cases and materials.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE 10
REASONS FOR NOT COVERING
A GENDER-RELATED TOPIC
Legend: A - Not covered or poorly covered in textbook
B - Professor uncomfortable with topic
C - Adverse student reaction
D - Not as important as other topics
E - Belongs in another course
Topic Responses A B C D E
Killing of fetus as homicide (38) 29.0 2.6 55.3 13.2
Abortion (103) 17.3 0.9 24.3 58.3
Conspiracy between spouses (134) 23.1 0.7 0.7 72.7 2.8
Battering by spouses (63) 39.7 - - 46.0 14.3
Self-defense by battered women (41) 58.4 - - 34.1 7.3
Reasonableness and gender (59) 27.1 1.7 1.7 52.5 16.9
Wife's misconduct as provocation (61) 27.9 - 1.6 65.6 4.9
Rape: Elements (24) 20.8 8.3 - 70.1 -
Rape: Mistake-of-fact defense (7) * * * * *
Rape: Diminished-capacity defense (79) 29.7 1.3 58.2 11.4
Rape: Death penalty (93) 19.3 - 57.0 23.7
Rape: Potential victims (57) 38.1 1.8 1.8 56.3 1.8
Statutory rape: Elements (29) 13.8 - - 82.8 3.4
Statutory rape: Mistake-of-fact defense (16) 31.2 62.5 6.3
Sexual harassment (168) 23.2 32.1 44.6
Failure to act (13) 30.8 38.5 30.8
Gender: Sentencing standards (165) 26.0 39.3 34.5
Gender: Capital punishment (159) 23.2 45.3 31.4
Gender: Treatment of victims/witnesses (142) 21.0 42.8 36.2
Gender: Culpability of accomplices (151) 24.7 60.3 16.0
Prosecutor discretion: "Turning" (153) 19.6 38.7 41.9
Marital duress (119) 26.9 0.8 65.5 6.7
Prostitution: Elements (140) 19.2 - 0.7 72.9 7.1
Prostitution: Criminalization (103) 11.8 1.0 - 74.8 12.6
Prostitution: Vagueness (121) 16.5 - 71.9 11.6
Prostitution: Sanctions on "johns" (125) 22.4 - 66.4 11.2
Pornography (150) 14.0 0.7 43.2 42.4
PMS defense (135) 34.1 1.5 57.0 7.4
Ways to correct sex discrimination in laws (148) 16.2 0.7 30.4 52.7
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 24:1
TABLE 11
COVERAGE OF GENDER-RELATED CRIMINAL LAW TOPICS
BY SEX OF PROFESSOR
Coverage (in %) M!F
Topic Males' Females b  Ratio
Killing of fetus as homicide 84.5 80.6 1.05
Abortion 54.1 41.7 1.30
Conspiracy between spouses 41.2 19.4 2.12
Battering by spouses 67.3 80.6 .84
Self-defense by battered women 79.5 88.9 .89
Reasonableness and gender 64.4 80.0 .81
Wife's misconduct as provocation 66.8 64.7 1.03
Rape: Elements 87.2 80.6 1.08
Rape: Mistake-of-fact defense 94.4 97.1 .97
Rape: Diminished-capacity defense 57.1 30.6 1.87
Rape: Death penalty 48.7 44.4 1.10
Rape: Potential victims 72.0 45.7 1.58
Statutory rape: Elements 86.4 72.2 1.20
Statutory rape: Mistake-of-fact defense 89.9 91.7 .98
Sexual harassment 11.8 5.6 2.11
Failure to act 91.3 100.0 .91
Gender: Sentencing standards 12.9 17.1 .75
Gender: Capital punishment 17.3 14.3 1.21
Gender: Treatment of victims/witnesses 24.4 24.2 1.01
Gender: Culpability of accomplices 21.8 5.9 3.70
Prosecutorial discretion: "Turning" 17.9 5.7 3.14
Marital duress 36.7 22.2 1.65
Prostitution: Elements 27.9 5.6 4.98
Prostitution: Criminalization 47.5 38.9 1.22
Prostitution: Vagueness 35.2 22.2 1.59
Prostitution: Sanctions on "johns" 34.3 22.2 1.55
Pornography 23.4 8.3 1.21
PMS defense 29.6 30.6 .97
Ways to correct sex discrimination in laws 20.6 28.6 .72
'Ns range from 194-200.
bNs range from 33-36.
248
FALL 1990] Sex-Bias Topics 249
APPENDIX B
QUESTIONNAIRE
Course and Course Materials:
1. Is the basic criminal law course a required course at your
school?
1. Yes (ANSWER QUESTION 2a)
2. No (ANSWER QUESTION 2b)
2a. If yes, in what year?
2b. If no, do most students take it anyway?
1. Yes 2. No 8. Don't know
3. How many credits is the basic criminal law course at your
school?
credits How many semesters? __ semesters
4. What other criminal law courses are offered at your school?
5. Does your school offer a course in sex-based discrimination?
1. Yes 2. No 3. Don't know
6. What casebook do you use to teach the basic criminal law
course?
a. Author(s): Edition:
b. Why did you select this particular casebook?
c. How long have you used this casebook, including previous
editions? __ years
d. Which parts of the casebook are assigned? (You may attach
syllabus)
7. Please name any other hornbook, treatise, or book used:
8. Other materials assigned:
(If these are mimeo materials, compiled by you, we would
appreciate your sending a set)
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9. What substantive crimes does the course cover?
10. What are the three most important things you want to cover in





The following is a list of some topics affecting women or that
might be of particular concern to one sex. Please indicate whether
you cover the topic in your course and, if so, approximately how
many class hours you spend on it. Some of these topics may not be
"covered" per se but may arise in the context of a case used to
"cover" another topic. If so, and if you then highlight or discuss the
topic, indicate that you "cover" it. If you do not cover the topic in
your course, please indicate why not by circling the appropriate
number, 1-6, as follows:
1. Not covered in the book (would cover it if it were in the
book).
2. Covered too poorly in the book.
3. Professor feels uncomfortable with the topic.
4. Adverse student reaction to the topic.
5. Not as important as other topics.
6. Belongs in another course (specify which course on line
below) or other (Please explain on line below).
You may circle more than one number if appropriate. Finally,
indicate whether the topic tends to polarize male and female
students.
[CATEGORIES PROVIDED FOR EACH TOPIC]
Do you Time spent If not covered, Does topic
cover in on topic why not? polarize
course? (in hours) M/F students
Yes No 123456 Yes No
11. Killing of fetus as homicide.
12. Abortion.
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13. Conspiracy between spouses.
14. Battering by spouses.
15. Self-defense by battered women.
16. Relationship between reasonableness and gender ("reasonable
man").
17. Wife's misconduct as provocation.
18. Rape:
a. Elements of the crime.
[no b]
c. Mistake of fact defense.
d. Diminished capacity defense.
e. Death penalty for.
f. Who can be a victim.
19. Statutory rape:
a. Elements of the crime.
b. Mistake of fact defense.
20. Sexual harassment.
21. Criminalization of failure to act, e.g., child neglect.
22. Gender differentials:
a. In sentencing standards.
b. In capital punishment.
c. In treatment of victim and witnesses in the criminal justice
system.
d. In degrees of culpability of accomplices.
23. Prosecutorial discretion regarding who to "turn" against whom.
24. Doctrine of marital duress.
25. Prostitution:
a. Elements of the crime
b. Criminalization.
c. Vagueness.
d. Criminal sanctions on "Johns".
26. Pornography.
27. Premenstrual syndrome (PMS) defense.
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28. Ways that sex discrimination in laws can be corrected.
Background Information
29. How many years have you taught in law school? __ years
30. How long have you taught criminal law? __ years
31. How long did you practice criminal law?
__ years 99. Have not practiced criminal law.
32. What law school(s) did you attend?
Graduated 19
Graduated 19
33. Roughly, what is the percentage of women students at your
law school? %
34. What is your sex?
1. Male 2. Female
35. On a scale of 1 to 7, how important do you believe it is to teach
in the criminal law course the relationship between criminal law
and social and political concerns?
Not Very
Important Important
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Thank you for participating in this study. We would appreciate any
additional comments you might have:
